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This thesis analyzes the divisions among European governments regarding the 
March 2003 decision by a U.S.-led coalition to intervene in Iraq.  It offers case studies of 
the Italian decision to support this intervention and the French decision to oppose it.  
Each case study considers the genesis of the national decision and the key determinants, 
particularly economic interests, threat assessments, and European, international and 
domestic political concerns. 
The thesis investigates the hypothesis that each national decision was influenced 
by factors in addition to the issues immediately in question—that is, whether the Iraqi 
regime headed by Saddam Hussein had complied with the UN Security Council 
resolutions calling for the destruction of WMD and certain delivery means and, if not, 
whether the use of force was an appropriate and justified course of action.   
Much of the literature on this rift focuses on the European-American dimension of 
the crisis.  More particularly, the literature discusses possible outcomes for individual 
countries with respect to their continued relations with the United States.  This exclusive 
focus on bilateral relations between individual European nations and the United States 
diverts attention away from the dynamics of another set of key relationships—those 
among European countries.  The distance between the French and Italian governments’ 
positions on Iraq was wide, and exchanges between President Chirac and Prime Minister 
Berlusconi were acrimonious.   
This research is important for three reasons.  First, European NATO nations have 
historically been among America’s closest allies.  If these relationships are to continue in 
a strong and positive manner, American policy makers must consider the factors that 
drove specific decisions by European governments.  Second, if the European Union’s two 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (France and the United 
Kingdom) opposed US policy, this could significantly hamper the United States in 
pursuit of its foreign policy goals.  Third, this analysis may assist policy makers and 
others (1) to better understand the internal political dynamics of France and Italy; and (2) 
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to structure US positions on issues in light of these dynamics, either the substance of the 
policy itself and/or its presentation. 
Appropriate analysis of this issue requires investigation of the relevant questions.  
What decision did leaders in France and Italy make?  As suggested above, France’s 
leaders ultimately opposed military intervention in Iraq without an additional UN 
Security Council mandate explicitly authorizing the use of force.  Moreover, they 
indicated a willingness to use France’s veto in the Security Council to deny a mandate for 
the use of force in the absence of additional evidence from the then-ongoing weapons 
inspections.  Italy’s leaders supported the American-led coalition’s intervention in Iraq, 
thereby asserting Italian membership in the coalition against terrorism.   
 What factors influenced leaders in France and Italy to take opposing stances on 
the prospective intervention in Iraq?  In articulating his position, French President 
Jacques Chirac enjoyed wide popular support.  Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s 
position was not popularly supported.  Indeed, Italian polls showed that over 75 percent 
of the population opposed intervention.  What domestic dynamics supported the decisions 
made by President Chirac, and what considerations encouraged Prime Minister 
Berlusconi to support the United States without wide domestic support?    What 
international factors influenced these leaders?  This thesis seeks to clarify the relative 
weight of these various factors in the French and Italian decisions.   
Responses to these questions may illuminate the prospects for future relations 
within the European Union and between EU members and the United States.  Does the 
division on the intervention in Iraq reflect an enduring change of political alignments 
inside the European Union or inside NATO?  What may be the short- and long-term 
effects of these decisions on French and Italian relations with the United States?  Was 
France’s decision against supporting American policy an isolated occurrence based on 
domestic factors, or does it signal a trend towards increased opposition to American 
foreign policy objectives?  Was the Italian decision an anomaly, in view of the Italian 
public’s negative attitude towards unsanctioned intervention?  The analysis is based on 
primary and secondary sources on the decisions and the policy-making processes of the 
governments of France and Italy.  Primary sources for this research include reputable 
international news agency reports of government action, political opposition or support, 
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and popular reaction and opinion.  In addition, French and Italian government 
communiqués and other publicly accessible statements are cited.  Secondary sources 
include interpretations and analyses by scholars and public policy research institutions.  
This analysis supports conclusions on the probable impact of each government’s 
decisions on relations with the United States and the country’s position in the EU and 
NATO. 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II examines the decisions of the 
French and Italian governments and the rationales for these decisions articulated at the 
time preceding the US-led coalition’s intervention in Iraq.  Chapter III explores the 
origins and determinants of those decisions in France, while Chapter IV performs this 
task for Italy.  Chapter V draws comparisons and analyzes the results of French and 
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II. DECISION AND RATIONALES 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 created a near-universal rallying 
around the United States.  The French newspaper Le Monde declared “We are all 
Americans,” and NATO invoked Article 5, the mutual defense clause in the North 
Atlantic Treaty.1  China, France and Russia supported the Bush Administration’s 
decision to attack Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  There was little 
international dissent regarding the United States declaration of war on terror.  If one 
compares this to the climate of opinion on the first anniversary of the attack, the 
international picture could not be more different.  Sympathy for the victims of 11 
September 2001 and support for the US government’s war on terror were replaced by 
hostility directed at the US approach to bringing about regime change in Iraq and 
antipathy towards perceived American arrogance. 
 This chapter explores the national decisions of France and Italy regarding the 
impending US-led coalition intervention in Iraq in the months prior to the initiation of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.  This chapter reviews the public statements by 
leaders in the United States, particularly President George Bush, Vice President Richard 
Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, and reactions to US policy statements by 
French President Jacques Chirac, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, and 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.   
US policy appeared more directed towards a conclusive solution to the problem of 
Iraq following the 11 September 2001 attacks.  At what point the Bush administration 
decided to pursue forcible regime change in Iraq, or if it ever had faith in the UN 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) are issues that will 
not be explored here.  It is assumed here that prior to late 2002 the US government had 
greater confidence in the efficacy of the measures pursued under the authority of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), including weapons inspections.   
                                                 
1 Jean-Marie Colombani, “We are all Americans.”  Le Monde (Paris), 12 September 2001, from the 
World Press Review (Vol 48, No. 11, November 2001).  http://www.worldpress.org/article_model.cfm 
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 This chapter is organized as follows.  Events are reviewed chronologically 
beginning with President George W. Bush’s 29 January 2002 State of the Union Address 
and ending on 19 March 2003 with the commencement of hostilities in Iraq.  Then this 
chapter explores the international debate, with attention to the following questions.  What 
was the goal of each government’s proposed actions, disarmament and/or regime change, 
and how did each government view these goals?  How did each government evaluate the 
role and value of UNMOVIC and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons 
inspections?  How relevant was UN Security Council action and what was the value of 
UN Security Council approval as perceived by the US, French and Italian governments?   
A. KEY DATES AND POSITIONS 
1. January – June 2002 
In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush introduced the “axis of 
evil” concept into public consciousness.  Three countries were included in the “axis of 
evil”:  Iran, Iraq and North Korea.  Iraq was spotlighted for continued flouting of UNSC 
mandates and employment of chemical weapons.  President Bush summarized his action 
plan toward rogue states:  “If we stop now—leaving terror camps intact and terror states 
unchecked—our sense of security would be false and temporary.  History has called 
America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to 
fight freedom’s fight.”2  The nature of the action envisaged—diplomatic, military, or 
economic—was not specified in this address, but was clarified subsequently.  
The French response was calm.  A French Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted 
that France was disinclined to define states as terrorist and that resolutions against 
terrorism were being considered in the United Nations.  Questions about possible French 
action to counter American unilateralism were dismissed.  A subsequent statement 
referred to a discussion with Secretary Powell, who denied any current US war plans.3   
During the first half of 2002, France was preoccupied with national elections.   
The focus of the French electorate and political leaders was directed to domestic issues, 
                                                 
2 US State of Union Address, 29 January 2002.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html 
3 French Foreign Affairs Statements, 30 January 2002 and 13 February 2002.  
http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actu/impression.gb.asp?ART=22583 
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particularly when Front National candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen defeated more the centrist 
socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, and became the alternative to the incumbent President, 
Jacques Chirac.  France overwhelmingly reelected President Chirac.  His party also won 
by a large majority in parliamentary elections.  The reelection gave President Chirac and 
his party an electoral mandate, but winning the election required an internal focus in the 
first half of 2002.4 
There was no official Italian reaction to President Bush’s State of the Union 
address.  The reasons for this may include domestic developments in the Italian 
government.  In early January 2002, Prime Minister Berlusconi’s Foreign Minister 
Renato Ruggiero resigned; rather than appointing another, Berlusconi combined the 
duties of Foreign and Prime Minister.  He was occupied with assuaging concern in the 
European Union about losing a popular foreign minister who was seen as pro-European 
Union, and spent considerable time countering charges of “Euroscepticism,” and 
articulating a nuanced policy towards the European Union in both the British and French 
media.5  Further, Berlusconi was under scrutiny domestically over conflict of interest 
charges regarding his business concerns. 
Commentary about a possible US-led intervention in Iraq moved off center stage, 
particularly in Europe, as various governments, including that of the United States, 
attempted from January 2002 to June 2002 to resolve the escalating crisis between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority. 
2. June – August 2002 
President Bush’s June 2002 commencement address at West Point signaled a 
change in his administration’s attitude towards Iraq.  Central themes included a 
heightened perception of Iraq as a direct threat to American security, and a loss of trust in 
security through isolation or “containment” measures, such as weapons inspections by 
international agencies. While President Bush did not refer explicitly to Iraq, he said,  
Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of 
mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide 
                                                 
4 “Analysis: French right triumphs,” BBC News Coverage of French Elections, May and June 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2048880.stm 
5  Interviews with Silvio Berlusconi in The Times (London) and Le Figaro Economie (Paris), 14 
January 2002 & 20 January 2002.  http://www.governo.it  
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them to terrorist allies.  Our security will require all Americans to be 
forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when 
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. 6    
In an August 2002 address to the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, Vice President Cheney reiterated President Bush’s assertion that containment was 
ineffective.  He identified a need for strong action against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Iraq, and expressed a lack of confidence in UN weapons inspections.  “A return of 
inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN 
resolutions.  On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort 
that Saddam was somehow ‘back in his box.’”  Other statements in this speech appeared 
to signal a more martial tone in US policy.  The Vice President described Saddam 
Hussein as a direct threat to the United States and its allies, and attributed to him an intent 
to use WMD.   
Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of 
mass destruction.  There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against 
our friends, against our allies, and against us.  And there is no doubt that 
his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations 
with his neighbors—confrontations that will involve both the weapons he 
has today , and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth.7  
Vice President Cheney’s remarks made military intervention appear inevitable.  
The elected leaders of this country have a responsibility to consider all of 
the available options.  And we are doing so.  What we must not do in the 
face of a mortal threat is give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness.  
We will not simply look away, hope for the best, and leave the matter for 
some future administration to resolve.  As President Bush has said, time is 
not on our side.  Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of 
a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, 
constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined.  The risks of inaction are 
far greater than the risk of action.  I am familiar with the arguments 
against taking action in the case of Saddam Hussein.  Some concede that 
Saddam is evil, power-hungry, and a menace—but [argue] that, until he 
crosses the threshold of actually possessing nuclear weapons, we should 
rule out any preemptive action.  That logic seems to me to be deeply 
                                                 
6 President Bush’s West Point Graduation Speech, 1 June 2002. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html 
7US Vice President Dick Cheney Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention, 26 August 2002; 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/print/20020826.html 
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flawed.  Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to 
the region.  With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once 
again.8   
In tandem, these speeches previewed an assertive, military approach to resolving the 
problem of WMD in Iraq, an expansive departure from earlier statements.   
There was no reaction to these speeches from the Italian government, and the 
reaction from the French government continued to be tranquil. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) was directly asked, “Do you have any comment on Dick Cheney’s 
statements indicating a shift in the justification for preventive strikes?” An MFA 
spokesperson responded, “There is a healthy debate going on in the United States…. We 
consider the top priority is for the inspectors to return without delay, unconditionally and 
without hindrance.”9  President Chirac acknowledged the growing danger of WMD 
proliferation, but maintained that there existed a wide array of tools to address the 
problem.  “The danger arising from weapons of mass destruction also comes from certain 
countries and is growing.  I’ve already had the opportunity to say it:  there is no single 
way to address the issue.”10  He advocated the development of legal constraints as well as 
strengthening the United Nations Security Council as more effective means to stop WMD 
proliferation.  
Prevention is first of all the development of restrictive legal instruments 
that prevent proliferation…These instruments are still incomplete, both in 
their scope and in their verification mechanisms. … The Security Council 
must take up this problem because these new dangers constitute a real 
menace to international peace and security.  I therefore propose that the 
Security Council meet at this level [heads of states] in tandem with the 
General Assembly, with a double mandate:  to assess the policy of 
nonproliferation and give it a new, decisive impetus.11 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 French Foreign Ministry of Affairs Statement, 27 August 2002 
10 “Le danger provenant des armes de destruction massive vient aussi de certains pays et il s’accroît.  
J’ai déjà eu l’occasion de le dire:  il n’y a pas qu’un seul moyen d’y fair face.”   
11 President Chirac speaks at a reception for ambassadors, 29 August 2002:  “La prevention, c’est 
d’abord le développement des instruments juridiques contraignants qui empêchent la proliferation. … Ces 
instruments sont encore incompletes, soit dans leur portée, soit dans leurs mechanisms de verification.  Il 
faut donc persuader les pays récalcitrants or sceptiques que cette voie est la bonne.  Le Conseil de Sécurité 
doit se saisir de ce problème, car ces nouveaux dangers constituent un menace réelle à la paix et à la 
sécurité internationale.  Et je propose donc que le Conseil se réunisse à ce niveau en 2003, en marge de 
 10
There are few explanations for the absence of any official reaction from Italy, 
although Berlusconi’s domestic legal troubles combined with the absence of a separate 
Foreign Minister may have contributed to keeping the burgeoning US inclination to use 
force in Iraq off the Italian domestic agenda.   
3. September 2002 
A September 2002 press conference by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
President Bush added to the public debate the statement that intelligence suggested that 
Iraq was within six months of developing a nuclear weapon.12   The US administration 
also released two important documents: A Decade of Deception and Defiance reviewing 
the offenses of the Iraqi regime, and the United States National Security Strategy.13  The 
possibility of an Iraqi nuclear weapon highlighted the US administration’s perceptions of 
a threat while the National Security Strategy unveiled its approach to international 
relations. 
On 12 September 2002, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA).  His remarks concerned the imminence of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD 
proliferation.  He outlined six conditions Iraq’s leaders had to meet in order to avoid the 
threat of military intervention: 
• “immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy 
all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material” 
• “immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it  
• “cease persecution of its civilian population”  
• “release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown,” 
and “accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait” 
                                                                                                                                                 
l’Assemblée général, avec un double mandate:  faire le bilan de la politique de non-prolifération et lui 
donner un nouvelle impulsion decisive.”  http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-
bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2002/0208AM  
 
12 White House Press Release, “President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Discuss Keeping the Peace,” 7 
September 2002.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020907-2.html 
13 White House releases: A Decade of Deception and Defiance, 12 September 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov; and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov 
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• “immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.”14 
 
The President highlighted his certainty that Iraq possessed WMD, the great 
potential for Iraq to collaborate with Al Qaeda, and the immediacy of the threat.   
And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad 
ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to 
kill on a massive scale.  In one place—in one regime—we find all these 
dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of 
aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront. … With every 
step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible 
weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow.  And if an 
emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then 
the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater 
horrors.15 
President Chirac urged a change in the proposed American course of action, 
noting that French goals were to find and destroy WMD, and to maintain UNSC unity.  
France did not support unilateral preventive action or regime change, concerned that it 
would set an untenable precedent and would undermine the coalition in the war on terror. 
As soon as one nation claims the right to take preventive action, other 
countries will naturally do the same. …   I think this is an extraordinarily 
dangerous doctrine that could have tragic consequences.  Preventive action 
can be undertaken if it appears necessary, but it must be taken by the 
international community, which today is represented by the United 
Nations Security Council…. I’m utterly opposed to unilateralism in the 
modern world…. Now, the Security Council has decided that Iraq must 
not have weapons of mass destruction; it did not say that a regime change 
was necessary there…. This coalition remains necessary to fight against 
terrorism…. This coalition must be managed cautiously.  That’s why I 
think everything should be done to ensure that the coalition isn’t 
jeopardized by an act that doesn’t have the approval of the international 
community and which would run the risk of undermining the coalition’s 
solidarity, notably in the Arab and Muslim countries. 
                                                 
14 White House Press Release, “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” 12 
September 2002.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020912-1.html 
15 Ibid. 
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The only reason Chirac admitted for military action was the absence of unfettered access 
for the weapons inspectors, as noted by the inspectors themselves.  He reiterated support 
for military action should the UNSC approve it.16 
Prime Minister Berlusconi strongly supported the American position during 
remarks to the UN General Assembly following President Bush’s speech, expressing 
Italy’s moral and political backing for disarmament in Iraq.  
 At this time the main challenge to the UN and to our system of values and 
principles comes from the regime governing Iraq that systematically 
violates all the resolutions of the United Nations.  A response to safeguard 
the international community from the danger of the accumulation of 
unconventional weapons of mass destruction is necessary and vital.17 
He followed up the UNGA remarks with a speech in Parliament in which he emphasized 
the threat of Iraqi WMD, but articulated a multilateral perspective.  “On the other hand, 
everyone agrees that the political regime of Iraq constitutes a regional and global danger, 
whatever the opinions are on the way to begin to remove this danger.”18  
Perhaps more cognizant of its direct impact on the domestic audience, Berlusconi 
neither advocated nor disavowed preemption as a course of action.  Instead, he focused 
on the failure of containment and the possibility that the use of force could become 
necessary, pointedly referring to the effects of appeasement before the Second World 
War.   
[T]he Americans taught us something that we Europeans had forgotten in 
the tragic months of appeasement, when at Munich with Italian mediation, 
Adolf Hitler succeeded in imposing the law of strength and fait accompli 
on European democracies intimidated and reluctant to act.  … Let us 
continue with courage in this political, diplomatic and military effort that 
                                                 
16 Interview with President Chirac, New York Times, 8 September 2002.  
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/arch0209/010909/english.htm 
17 Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the 57th UNGA, 13 September 2002. “In questo momento la 
principale sfida all’Onu e al nostro sistema di valori e di principi è portata dal regime che governa l’Iraq e 
che viola sistematicamente tutte le risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite.  È necessaria e indispensabile una 
risposta per salvaguardare la communità internazionale dal pericolo constituito da un accumulo di armi non 
convenzionali di sterminio di massa.”  http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma.index.html   
18 Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the House of Deputies, 25 September 2002.  “D’altra parte, sul 
fatto che il regime politico iracheno costituisca un pericolo regionale e globale concordano tutti, quale che 
sia l’opinione sulle vie da intraprendere per rimuovere questo pericolo.” 
http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma.index.html 
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the hard facts, considered without fanaticism but dispassionately, impose 
on us as a duty, a national duty.19 
4. October 2002-December 2002 
 President Bush’s speeches during the October-December 2002 period aimed three 
key messages relating to Iraq at domestic and international audiences.  The first was the 
urgency of the threat.   
On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. … In 
defiance of pledges to the UN, it has stockpiled biological and chemical 
weapons.  It is rebuilding the facilities used to make those weapons.20 
Second, he positively linked Iraq to Al Qaeda and asserted that the links were 10 years 
old.  Third, he emphasized the danger of collusion between Iraq and Al Qaeda.   
We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVS 
[unmanned aerial vehicles] for missions targeting the United States.  And, 
of course, sophisticated delivery systems aren’t required for a chemical or 
biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and one 
terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it.  And that is the source 
of our urgent concern about Saddam Hussein’s links to international 
terrorist groups.  … We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level 
contacts that go back a decade.21   
President Bush summarized by emphasizing the lack of UN progress over the past 
twelve years.   
Some believe we can address this danger by simply resuming the old 
approach to inspections, and applying diplomatic and economic pressure.  
Yet this is precisely what the world has tried to do since 1991.  Clearly, to 
actually work, any new inspections, sanctions or enforcement mechanisms 
will have to be very different.  America wants the UN to be an effective 
                                                 
19 Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the House of Deputies, 25 September 2002.  “[G]li americani 
ci hanno insegnato qualcosa che, noi europei avevamo dimenticato nei mesi tragici dell’appeasement, 
quando a Monaco, con la mediazione italiana, Adolf Hitler reuscì a imporre la legge della forze e del fatto 
compiuto su democrazie europee intimidate e riluttanti ad agire.  … proseguiamo con coraggio in quello 
sforzo politico, diplomatico e militare che i nudi fatti, guardati senza fanatismo ma anzi con freddezze, ci 
impongono come un “dovere, come un dovere nazionale.””  
http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma.index.html 
20 White House Press Releases, “President, House Leaders Agree on Iraq Resolution.” 2 October 
2002.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021005.html  
21 White House Press Releases, “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat.” 7 October 2002.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021007-8.html  
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organization that helps keep the peace.  And that is why we are urging the 
Security Council to adopt a new resolution setting out tough, immediate 
requirements.22   
On 16 October 2002, a joint resolution of the US House of Representatives and the US 
Senate authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq.  
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States 
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the 
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed 
by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council 
resolutions regarding Iraq.23 
In contrast, President Chirac emphasized the central role of the UNSC in 
disarming Iraq—whether disarmament came through an inspections regime or through 
military force.  He proposed an iterative process wherein the UNSC would establish 
standards to be met, and would address instances of Iraqi noncompliance.  This proposal 
removed the need for an automatic use of force clause in the resolution.  At the same 
time, France never explicitly ruled out UNSC-approved military action.  Queried about 
France’s projected actions at the UNSC—abstain, support or veto measures being 
proposed—Chirac responded with three observations.  First, that President Bush’s 
administration wanted a resolution authorizing military interventions, a clause he 
believed unnecessary.  Second, UN weapons inspectors would assess Iraqi obstruction 
and material breach, not France or the United States.  Third, if Iraqi obstructions 
occurred, the UNMOVIC needed to inform the UNSC, which would then determine an 
appropriate response.24 
President Chirac and Prime Minister Berlusconi jointly addressed the press one 
day before UNSC Resolution 1441 was up for a vote.  When asked about pressure to 
support a US-backed resolution, President Chirac deferred questions regarding the use of 
force.  He highlighted underlying issues, citing concerns that preventive wars set a 
                                                 
22 Ibid 
23US Congress, Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (H.J. res. 
114), Public Law 107-243, 107th Congress, 16 October 2002.  http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ243.107  
24 President Chirac and President Mubarak speak at a joint press conference (Egypt), 16 October 2002.  
http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2002/0210AL0  
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dangerous precedent, and declared that such military decisions belonged in the UNSC to 
preserve legitimacy.  Responding to the same questions, Berlusconi’s stance was 
ambiguous.  He supported Chirac’s position, but added his wish that the situation be 
resolved to everyone’s satisfaction.25 
UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was a compromise between the Americans, 
who wanted a strong penalty-oriented resolution, and the French, who advocated a 
phased process without an automatic triggering mechanism.  UNSCR 1441 obligated Iraq 
to disarm, to submit to an inspections regime, and to provide detailed data about its 
weapons programs. 26  This resolution did not specify the mechanism to identify material 
breach or failure to comply, and in that respect, was open to interpretation by either side 
of the debate. 
American rhetoric about the imminence of the Iraqi threat moderated significantly 
following the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1441.  There may be several explanations.  
One consideration is that the negotiations leading up to the UN Security Council vote 
coincided with US national midterm elections.  The administration may have been 
willing to let UN inspectors return to Iraq to palliate international opposition.  With 
support from the US House of Representatives and Senate for President Bush to take 
action without additional UN Security Council approval, the administration may have felt 
less pressure to act immediately.  IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors were in a difficult 
situation; whatever they discovered could be interpreted to suit the argument either for or 
against rapid military intervention.   
There were few statements of policy regarding Iraq from the French or the Italians 
following the 7 November 2002 joint press conference.  In his end-of-year report, Prime 
Minister Berlusconi alluded to “winds of war” in conjunction with possible war in Iraq 
and the danger of international terrorism, but the majority of his remarks focused on 
domestic issues.27  President Chirac also made one public statement during this respite 
                                                 
25 President Chirac and Prime Minister Berlusconi speak at a joint press conference (Rome), 7 
November 2002.  http://www.elysee.fr.cgi-in/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2002/0211RO  
26 UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002 
27 Prime Minister Berlusconi’s remarks to reporters, 30 December 2002 
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between 8 November 2002 and January 2003, restating his confidence in weapons 
inspections and the need for Iraq to disarm.28 
5. January 2003-February 2003 
In January 2003, President Chirac reaffirmed his confidence in the capabilities of 
the weapons inspectors and the value of inspections.  He observed that UNSCOM 
weapons inspections had located and destroyed more WMD than had the first Gulf War, 
and reasserted the opinion that military intervention required explicit additional UN 
Security Council approval.   
Until 1998, when unfortunately interrupted, the inspections permitted the 
discovery and destruction of a considerable number of weapons of mass 
destruction.  In total, more were destroyed by inspections in that era than 
by the war in the Gulf.29  
 In comments directed perhaps at the Bush administration, Chirac said, “I conclude by 
saying that, for France, war is always evidence of failure, is always the worst of 
solutions.”30    
In a 23 January 2003 New York Times article, “Why We Know He’s Lying,” US 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice expounded on the administration’s lack of 
confidence in weapons inspections.  The gist of her argument was a comparison between 
the disarmament efforts of former Soviet republics and those of Iraq.  The governments 
of Kazakhstan and Ukraine took weapons inspectors to various sites, presented 
dismantled weapons, destroyed missiles and silos, and turned over a ton of enriched 
uranium.  This was contrasted with the Iraqi failure to provide verifiable information or 
to reveal its proscribed missiles and WMD stockpiles.  
Iraq’s behavior could not offer a starker contrast [to the former Soviet 
republics].  Instead of a commitment to disarm, Iraq has a high-level 
political commitment to maintain and conceal its weapons, led by Saddam 
                                                 
28 President Chirac press conference (NATO Summit, Prague) 22 November 2002.  
http://www.elysee/fr/cgi-bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2002/0211PR0 
29 Comments by President Chirac during a joint press conference with Mr. Hans Blix, Mr. Mohammed El 
Baradai (Paris) 17 January 2003.  “Jusque’en 1998, où il a été malheuresement interompu, les inspections 
ont permis la découverte et la destruction d’un nombre considerable d’armes de destruction massive.  Au 
total, plus ont été détruites par l’inspection à cette époque que par la guerre du Golfe.”  
http://www.elysee.for/cgi/bin/auracom/aurweb/file?aur_file=discours/2003/030106H  
30 Ibid., “Je conclus en disant que, pour la France, la guerre est toujours le constat d’un échec, est 
toujours la pire des solutions…” 
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Hussein and his son Qusay, who controls the Special Security 
Organization, which runs Iraq’s concealment activities.  Instead of 
implementing national initiatives to disarm, Iraq maintains institutions 
whose sole purpose is to thwart the work of the inspectors.  And instead of 
full cooperation and transparency, Iraq has filed a false declaration to the 
United Nations that amounts to a 12,200-page lie.31    
President Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union Address heralded another 
pivotal policy change towards intervention in Iraq.  Exhortations for the UN’s members 
to unite and act against Saddam Hussein were combined with a litany of his offenses.  
The President indicated that America and its allies would no longer tolerate the 
continuation of weapons inspections that had no prospect for success.   
We have called upon the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by 
its demand that Iraq disarm. … Almost three months ago, the United 
Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm.  
He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations, and for the 
opinion of the world.  The 108 UN inspectors … were not sent to conduct 
a scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a country the size of 
California. 
 Included in the speech for the first time were promises of salvation and deliverance 
aimed directly at the Iraqi people.  “And tonight I have a message for the brave and 
oppressed people of Iraq:  Your enemy is not surrounding your country—your enemy is 
ruling your country.  And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the 
day of your liberation.”  These three elements created an impression of the inevitability 
of a US-led military intervention.  
The world has waited 12 years for Iraq to disarm.  America will not accept 
a serious and mounting threat to our country, and our friends and our 
allies.  The United States will ask the UN Security Council to convene on 
February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq’s ongoing defiance of the 
world.  Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence 
about … Iraq’s illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those 
weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups.  We will 
consult.  But let there be no misunderstanding:  If Saddam Hussein does 
                                                 
31 White House Press Release, “Why We Know Iraq is Lying.”  A Column by Dr. Condoleezza Rice 
in New York Times, 23 January 2003.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030123-
1.html  
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not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the 
world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.32 
Three days later, on 31 January 2003 in a joint press conference with British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Bush set a deadline for Iraqi compliance with an 
implied end to UN wrangling. 
This is a matter of weeks, not months.  Any attempt to drag the process on 
for months will be resisted by the United States. … It’s not just a test for 
the United States or for Britain.  It’s a test for the international 
community, too.  And the judgment has to be, at the present time, that 
Saddam Hussein is not cooperating with the inspectors, and therefore is in 
breach of the UN resolution.  And that’s why time is running out.33   
5 February 2003 saw one of the last efforts to secure explicit additional UNSC 
approval for military action in Iraq, as Secretary Powell briefed the UNSC on the 
American position regarding prospective intervention.  There were two salient messages 
in his presentation.  The first was American impatience with the weapons inspections 
regime.  UNMOVIC inspectors found a few empty chemical weapons artillery shells, 
plus missiles whose range exceeded the permitted range of 150 kilometers.  Inspectors 
were not finding, and Iraqi officials were not revealing, caches of chemical or biological 
weapons, mobile labs, or the capacity to construct nuclear weapons.  Powell contended 
that such items would never be found in the course of weapons inspections.  As proof he 
played recordings of intercepted phone calls between Iraqi officials that were presented to 
the Security Council as evidence of deceptions of weapons inspectors.  The second 
relevant message in Powell’s remarks was the incipient irrelevance of the UNSC should 
it fail to act.  
Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for 
in UN Resolution 1441.  And this body places itself in danger of 
irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding 
effectively and immediately.  The issue before us is not how much time 
we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction.  
But how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq’s noncompliance 
                                                 
32 White House Press Release, “State of the Union Address.”  28 January 2003.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html  
33 White House Press Release, Joint press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 31 
January 2003.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/2003/01/print/20030131-23.html 
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before we, as a council, we, as the United Nations, say:  ‘Enough, 
Enough.’34   
The Bush administration appeared impatient with further UNSC negotiations.  On 
6 February 2003, following Secretary Powell’s address, President Bush accented the 
imminent danger Iraq posed.   
The Iraqi regime’s violations of Security Council resolutions are evident, 
and they continue to this hour. …The Iraqi regime has actively and 
secretly attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons.  Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and 
al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s.  Iraq has sent 
bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with Al Qaeda.  Iraq 
has also provided Al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons 
training. … The danger Saddam Hussein poses reaches across the world. 
The President charged the UNSC to make a stand.   
The dictator of Iraq is making his choice.  Now the nations of the Security 
Council must make their own. … Now the Security Council will show 
whether its words have any meaning.  Having made its demands, the 
Security Council must not back down, when those demands are defied and 
mocked by a dictator. 
The President concluded, “The game is over.35  Given the deadline established jointly 
with Prime Minister Blair, intervention appeared certain.  
French rhetoric became more pointed and confrontational after Secretary Powell’s 
presentation to the UNSC.  President Chirac disputed the American image of the French 
as pacifists in his February 2003 interview in Time.  He pinpointed possible adverse 
outcomes of military intervention in Iraq—e.g., “creating a large number of little bin 
Ladens”—while highlighting his view of the proper solution—international isolation and 
control of Iraq through weapons inspections.  He again expressed his support for military 
intervention if weapons inspectors reported to the UNSC that Iraq was uncooperative. 
It’s up to them [the inspectors] to come before the Security Council and 
say, ‘We won.  It’s over.  There are no more weapons of mass 
                                                 
34 White House Press Release, “US Secretary of State addresses UNSC.” 5 February 2003.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/2003/02/print/20030205-1.html 
 
35 White House Press Release, “The World Can Rise to this Moment.” 6 February 2003.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030206-17.html  
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destruction,’ or ‘It’s impossible for us to fulfill our mission.  We’re 
coming up against Iraqi ill will and impediments.’  At that point, the 
Security Council would have to discuss this report and decide what to do.  
In that case, France would naturally exclude no option.   
One interesting aspect of this interview is how he addressed the issue of America’s role 
as the world’s only superpower.  While he denied any desire to balance American power, 
he stated that he thought the world was a more dangerous place with only one dominant 
power, and that he favored a multipolar world with Europe having its rightful place. 
Any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one 
and provokes reactions.  That’s why I favor a multipolar world, in which 
Europe obviously has its place.36 
French skepticism about the accuracy of Powell’s assessment and the wisdom of 
the policy prescription advanced by the Bush administration grew more pronounced as 
war seemed to become more inevitable.  In a barbed speech to the UNSC on 14 February 
2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin dismissed the image of UNSC 
member countries pursuing conflicting agendas.  In a point-by-point rebuttal of the 
American position articulated by Secretary Powell, he expounded French 
counterarguments.  He first disputed American assertions that inspections were failing, 
citing Iraqi permission for aerial reconnaissance, permission to question scientists 
without government minders, and the provision of a detailed list of experts who had 
witnessed previous destructions of military capabilities as proofs of success.  Villepin 
then refocused the debate away from the immediate decision—intervention or 
inspections—towards a post-war scenario, implying that it was irresponsible to undertake 
a near-term war when reconstruction and peace would be difficult to establish.  Further, 
he questioned reported links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, expressing doubt about their 
existence based on French intelligence reports.  He concluded, “Given this context, the 
use of force is not justified at this time.”37   
The Italian position regarding the debate was more diffuse.  In a press conference 
at the White House with President Bush, Prime Minister Berlusconi affirmed Italy’s 
                                                 
36 Interview with President Chirac in Time Magazine, 16 February 2003. 
http://www.elysee.fr/and/actus/iraq/february16.htm  
37 Speech by Dominique de Villepin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs at the UNSC, 14 February 
2003.  http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/pring_bul.gb.asp?liste=20030219.gb.html  
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faithful allegiance to the United States.  However, rather than expressing emphatic 
support for or opposition to intervention, Berlusconi viewed his role as convincing others 
that the threat of terrorism was real; his target audience included the European Union, the 
United States and the Russian Federation.  His message was that a united front would 
better convince Saddam Hussein to reveal his WMD for destruction.  When asked 
directly whether his support for the United States included participation in a military 
intervention, Berlusconi replied, “we will never forget that we owe our freedom to the 
United States of America.”38  
 Prime Minister Berlusconi’s remarks to the Italian parliament following 
Secretary Powell’s UNSC address are striking in three aspects.  He started by reiterating 
Powell’s central themes concerning the imminent danger of terrorism and WMD 
proliferation, the futility of weapons inspections, and the possible need for military 
intervention.  However, he shifted his focus to managing domestic public and political 
perceptions of his government’s role in the evolving crisis.  His speech was aimed more 
at ensuring strong support for his international positions than at convincing the Italian 
parliament of the merits of supporting either the American or French position.39 
6. February-March 2003 
During late February and early March 2003, President Bush’s speeches could be 
interpreted as preparing the American people and foreign nations for the imminent armed 
intervention in Iraq.  In the course of a 26 February speech to the American Enterprise 
Institute, the President articulated a vision for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and 
highlighted the humanitarian reasons for American intervention.  
A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital 
region [that is, the Middle East], by bringing hope and progress into the 
lives of millions.  America’s interests in security and America’s belief in 
liberty both lead in the same direction:  to a free and peaceful Iraq. … 
Bringing stability and unity to a free Iraq will not be easy.  Yet that is no 
excuse to leave the Iraqi regime’s torture chambers and poison labs in 
operation.  Any future the Iraqi people choose for themselves will be 
better than the nightmare world that Saddam Hussein has chosen for them. 
                                                 
38 White House Press Release, “President Bush meets with Italian PM Berlusconi,” 30 January 2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030130-10.html  
39 Statement by Prime Minister Berlusconi to the Joint Italian Parliament on the Iraqi situation, 6 
February 2003.  http://www.governo.it/GovernaInforma.index.html  
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…  The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of 
Iraq’s new government.  That choice belongs to the Iraqi people.  Yet, we 
will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another.  All Iraqis 
must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their 
rights protected.40 
On 8 March 2003, President Bush denounced Iraq as uncooperative during his 
radio address to the nation.  He began with an allusion to a report by Dr. Hans Blix, 
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, who had provided a progress report to the UNSC on 
Iraqi disarmament the previous day.41  President Bush presented Dr. Blix’s report as 
evidence of Iraq’s continued obstruction of disarmament.  
Unfortunately, it is clear that Saddam Hussein is still violating the 
demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm.  … Iraqi operatives 
continue to play a shell game with inspectors, moving suspected 
prohibited materials to different locations every 12 to 24 hours.  … These 
are not the actions of a regime that is disarming.  These are the actions of a 
regime engaged in a willful charade. 
He concluded that Americans must be prepared to use military force should Saddam 
Hussein resist peaceful disarmament. 42 
During his 15 March 2003 radio address, the President indicated there was “little 
reason to hope” for peaceful disarmament in Iraq.  He drew attention to the anniversary 
of Iraqi chemical weapons attacks on Iraqi Kurds in Halabja, highlighting this incident as 
an example of the capabilities of Saddam Hussein.  Furthermore, he cited USNC failures 
to act decisively as precursors to “tragedy” in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo.  The 
president concluded by expressing his doubts about Iraq’s voluntary disarmament and 
envisioned a case for the use of force in Iraq.  “There is little reason to hope that Saddam 
Hussein will disarm.  If force is required to disarm him, the American people can know 
                                                 
40 White House Press Release, “President Discusses the Future of Iraq,” 26 February 2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030216-11.html  
41 UN Security Council, “United Nations Weapons Inspectors Report to Security Council On Progress 
in Disarmament of Iraq.” Press Release # 7682, 7 March 2003.  
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7682.doc.htm  
It should be noted that other readers of Blix’s report drew conclusions at variance with those of 
President Bush. 
42 White House Press Release, “War on Terror,” President’s Radio Address, 8 March 2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030308-1.html.  
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that our armed forces have been given every tool and every resource to achieve 
victory.”43   
On 16 March 2003, President Bush held a joint press conference in the Azores 
with key allies—British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Spanish President José Maria Aznar, 
and Portuguese Prime Minister José Durão Barroso.  The purpose of their meeting was to 
reaffirm transatlantic linkages and to demonstrate allied solidarity.  President Bush 
established a short deadline, for the UNSC and for Iraq.   
And we concluded that tomorrow is a moment of truth for the world.  
Many nations have voiced a commitment to peace and security.  And now 
they must demonstrate that commitment to peace and security in the only 
effective way, by supporting the immediate and unconditional 
disarmament of Saddam Hussein.44  
On 16 March 2003, Christiane Amanpour interviewed President Chirac for a 
television broadcast.  Chirac repeated his opposition to military intervention in Iraq.  
Responding to questions central to the WMD debate, President Chirac indicated that he 
was unsure about whether Saddam Hussein possessed huge stockpiles of WMD, but that 
the way to discover the truth and remove the problem was weapons inspections.  Even at 
this late date, though, President Chirac did not rule out the potential for military 
intervention in the event that the UN weapons inspectors were at an impasse.45  
On 17 March 2003 President Bush indicated that the opportunity for a non-
military solution in Iraq was ending.  He referred to the failure of over a decade of 
international effort in peacefully disarming Iraq.  The president contrasted the “honorable 
efforts” of the international community with the deceptions of the Iraqi regime.  Finally, 
he reiterated the combined danger that Saddam Hussein, Iraqi WMD, and Al Qaeda 
terrorists posed.  “The danger is clear:  using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear 
weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions 
and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any 
                                                 
43 White House Press Release, “President Discusses Iraq in Radio Address,” 15 March 2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030315.html.  
44 White House Press Release, “President Bush:  Monday ‘Moment of Truth’ for World on Iraq.  16 
March 2003.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030316-3..html.  
45 Interview with President Chirac for CNN/60 Minutes, 16 March 2003.  
http://www.cnn.com/2003/world/europe/03/16/sprj.irq.amanpour.chirac/index.html  
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other.”  In recommending that all media personnel and inspectors leave Iraq, President 
Bush presaged the beginning of the military conflict.   
Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours.  Their 
refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our 
choosing.  For their own safety, all foreign nationals—including 
journalists and inspectors—should leave Iraq immediately.46   
On 19 March 2003, President Bush announced that coalition forces had begun a military 
campaign to “disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave 
danger.”47 
On the same day, Prime Minister Berlusconi spoke to the Italian Parliament 
regarding the direction of the crisis.  He noted that the UNSC was unable to find a 
compromise solution, and he blamed France for the breakdown in unity.   The purpose of 
his discourse to the Parliament was to report his decision to allow the United States 
basing and over flight access, as well as to assure parliamentarians both allied with him 
and in opposition that there would be no active Italian involvement in the intervention.48  
By March 2003, a US-led military intervention appeared inevitable.  Compromise 
between the American and French positions was impossible, given American timetables 
and French insistence on giving weapons inspectors more time.  Italian support for the 
American policy was steady, but consisted only of political support.  Both France and 
Italy passively supported the American effort once a course of action was decided.  
France allowed over flights of its sovereign airspace, while Italy permitted both over 
flights and basing of deploying US troops and equipment.  
B. GOAL:  DISARMAMENT OR REGIME CHANGE? 
The Italian government never issued a comprehensive policy statement about the 
uniquely Italian position.  France and the United States differed widely on their 
objectives regarding the future of Iraq.   Although both governments deplored the regime 
of Saddam Hussein, the prospect of a preventive war, the goal of which was, from the 
                                                 
46 White House Press Release, “President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours.” 
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47 White House Press Release, “President Bush Addresses the Nation.”  19 March 2003.  
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outset, to oust a sovereign government, disturbed French officials.  One continued focus 
of President Chirac’s discourse was that the combination of preventive action and regime 
change was contrary to the tenets of international law as well as those espoused by the 
French constitution and political culture.  Moreover, Chirac argued that preventive war 
and regime change could set a dangerous precedent for other conflicted regions.  More 
generally, he noted that conflicts between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, and 
North and South Korea could escalate if the governments of those countries pursued 
similar foreign policies.49   
From the beginning of the public debate, the Bush administration focused on 
regime change and disarmament as parallel objectives.  In defining regime change, 
President Bush appeared cryptic between January and June 2002.  Many of his early 
speeches equated disarmament with regime change, stating his belief that if the Iraqi 
government completely disarmed, then it would be a fundamentally changed regime.  
However, Vice President Cheney’s address to the VFW in August 2002 painted a vision 
of Iraq following regime change as a liberated Iraq with a pluralistic and democratic 
government.  It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a liberated, pluralistic, 
disarmed Iraq could exist with Saddam Hussein as its leader.  Subsequent public dialogue 
reinforced this linkage of a new regime with a liberated Iraq; this lent credibility to the 
perception that regime change equated to an end to Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq.   
France focused on disarmament through weapons inspections as a means to 
contain Saddam Hussein.  Thus, the removal of Iraqi WMD would render Saddam 
Hussein a paper tiger; he would still be a heavy burden to the citizens of Iraq, but no 
longer a threat to the world.  Thus, a regime change would be welcome, but not required 
to neutralize the threat. 
Americans were still preoccupied with the threat of more terrorist attacks on the 
United States following the attacks of 11 September 2001.  The Bush administration 
clearly and consistently linked the Iraqi regime’s WMD with the possibility of future Al 
Qaeda attacks.  In this way, the Bush administration cast doubt on the effectiveness of 
UNSC-sponsored disarmament inspections as a containment device.  Instead, forcible 
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disarmament was linked with regime change as the only real way to ensure American and 
global security.  France perceived disarmament inspections as having intrinsic value as a 
method to prevent WMD proliferation.  The Bush administration deemed disarmament 
inspections absent regime change a threat to security. 
C. VALUE OF UNMOVIC INSPECTIONS 
As suggested above, the divergence in perceptions on regime change and 
disarmament carried directly into the evaluation of weapons inspections.  The French 
position can be summarized in three concepts.  First, more weapons had been destroyed 
during the post-conflict UNSCOM period than had been during the Gulf War.  Second, 
inspections were a painstaking, iterative process that required patience, but which would 
ultimately succeed in securing and destroying Iraq’s WMD stockpile.  Last, a protracted 
military intervention in Iraq could result in either the employment of WMD to counter the 
invasion, or during hostilities, the WMD could be shipped to neighboring states or 
potential allies, causing uncontrolled and hostile WMD proliferation.50 
Weapons inspections were viewed by the Bush administration as a futile 
distraction.  The Vice President suggested that, because Iraqi personnel were so devious, 
the weapons inspections could foster a false hope among Americans that WMD had been 
found and destroyed when, in fact, they had merely been hidden.  
[A] person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just 
get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over.  Saddam 
has perfected the game of cheat and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of 
denial and deception.  A return of inspectors would provide no assurance 
whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.51 
In February 2003 Secretary Powell presented to the UN Security Council 
recordings of intercepted conversations between Iraqi personnel apparently planning to 
hide material from UNMOVIC inspectors.  Weapons inspections, as far as the Bush 
administration was concerned, were just another opportunity for Iraq to play a cat-and-
mouse game with external powers while preserving or expanding its WMD cache and 
increasing the threat of WMD proliferation.   
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In support of both positions, the UNMOVIC reports of 27 November 2002 and 28 
February 2003 left the assessment of Iraqi cooperation as well as progress on weapons 
inspections open to interpretation.  A government could choose to interpret the weapons 
inspections as a successful work in progress or an abysmal failure.  Weapons inspectors 
were caught between powerful political and national security interests, and produced a 
report that was, as analyzed by Berlusconi, “a professional work, technical, that could not 
possibly not be open to political interpretations and conclusive decisions in light of 
resolution 1441.”52 
Presidents Chirac and Bush viewed the efficacy of weapons inspections as a 
means to constrain Saddam Hussein and remove and destroy WMD differently.  
Although the American administration agreed to allow some time for weapons inspectors 
to perform, there was little faith in the process.  Generally, statements by the Bush 
administration dismissed Iraqi gestures towards disarmament whereas statements by the 
French government tended to view those gestures as steps in the desired direction. 
D. RELEVANCE OF UN ACTION 
The United Nations was established to avert future wars using mechanisms of 
international dispute resolution such as international law and collective policing.  
Enshrined in the UN Charter are the concepts of international peace and security and of 
the sovereign equality of nations. The preamble to the Charter refers to the “equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small.”53  From the perspective of American 
policy makers, this makes the UN a powerful tool of policy legitimization when the 
United States desires to take action approved by the UN.  However, when the UN 
through the Security Council or through nonbinding resolutions in the UN General 
Assembly checks the power or direction of an American administration, the UN may 
appear to be an impediment rather than a supporting structure.   
The people and government of the United States have a complex and ambivalent 
relationship with the UN which has at times been articulated by noteworthy congressional 
leaders.  Support for the UN has waxed and waned with its perceived value on a number 
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of issues.  In the situation regarding Iraq, the Bush administration sought support in the 
UN. However, UN constraints during the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom frustrated 
members of the Bush administration who were reluctantly persuaded to present a case for 
action at the UN in September 2002 and in February 2003 once it became apparent that 
getting UNSC approval would be difficult.  The administration tried repeatedly to 
encourage UN action on Iraq by declaring that the UNSC would become irrelevant if it 
could not enforce its own mandates.  The Bush administration portrayed its decisions and 
actions as defending the UN from irrelevance.  President Bush’s justification for 
legitimate military intervention hinged on UNSC approval designated in UNSCRs 678 
and 687 which had never been rescinded.  For the French, supplementary explicit UNSC 
approval was the only source of legitimacy for military action.  
E. SUMMARY 
The American, French and Italian positions regarding the threat of Iraq’s WMD 
were similar.  The solution to the problem of how to deal with the threat is where the 
positions diverge.  The American inclination towards a military action was apparent as 
early as June 2002.  France was generally opposed to military action, and advocated this 
position increasingly firmly as the American position tended more towards military 
intervention.  Throughout the crisis, the Italian focus remained on balancing relations 
with France and the United States.  Berlusconi concurred with the US threat assessment, 









III. KEY DETERMINANTS-FRANCE 
Relations between France and the United States during the past 50 years have 
been tempestuous--from President de Gaulle’s withdrawal of French military assets from 
NATO’s integrated military structure, to Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine’s refusal to 
join the Community of Democracies, a US initiative under President Clinton that Védrine 
called a “pressure group for the promotion of democracies around the world.”54  
Védrine’s analogy is that of a love-hate relationship; the French are fascinated by 
America’s market economy, high-quality entertainment productions, and sense of 
individuality.  At the same time, the French are loath to cede their own identity, culture, 
political objectives or economic structures.55  As a result, French political leaders are 
often at odds with American political leaders on issues of foreign policy, economic 
development, and general influence in world politics.   
Against this backdrop, French objections to American proposals on military 
intervention in Iraq should be unsurprising.  Despite this trend, Aspen Institute analyst 
Marta Dassù predicted in September 2002, “it is equally likely that France will refrain 
from taking any high profile stance [on Iraq], given the serious risk of losing all of its 
stakes.  Having already burned its fingers at Rambouillet, France is probably unwilling to 
take any chances of overexposure this time around, especially by embarking on a path 
that might well turn out to lead nowhere in terms of visible political results.”56  Prior to 
September 2002, France’s posture was relatively mute; in reaction to increasingly explicit 
American indications of a willingness to use force, the French opposition to the American 
posture became more pronounced and contentious.  The result was the opposite of what 
Dassù envisioned:  the French did pursue a path with results that were, at best, 
ambiguous, and at worst, a political debacle.  
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President Chirac’s decision on the prospective US intervention in Iraq had its 
origins in several concerns.  His position was articulated in opposition to the American 
position as well as in opposition to certain EU member and prospective EU member 
governments.  Apart from the articulated issues, what factors may have shaped the 
French decision to oppose the US-led intervention in Iraq?  The roots of conflict over 
Iraq are entrenched in French political history, more shallowly in differing assessments of 
the threat of Iraq’s WMD and in dissimilar domestic political situations.  This chapter 
examines the political and strategic foci of the French government and how they affected 
the question of intervention.  In addition, it examines the domestic, European Union, and 
international dynamics that appear to have shaped the French decisions.  It also examines 
the differences between French and American threat assessments that influenced each 
nation’s action orientation.  From these analyses, it is possible to draw some preliminary 
conclusions regarding the interplay between American, French and EU actions and 
reactions. 
A. FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE 
The French believe in their long history of greatness and importance in Europe 
and in the world.  The genesis of French influence and leadership in Europe may be 
found in Charlemagne’s reign from 771 to 814 and continued with subsequent rulers, 
including François I, Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte.  This legacy contributed to a 
French sense of national exceptionalism, and perhaps even a belief in a divine calling to 
influence politics in the world.  Comparable beliefs in manifest destiny, exceptionalism, 
and a higher calling can also be found in American political traditions. 
Following stunning battlefield defeats in the First and Second World Wars, 
French leaders were insistent on reestablishing the respect, power, and grandeur due 
France as befitted the national legacy.  No single leader typified this drive more than 
Charles de Gaulle.  With Winston Churchill’s assistance, he ensured that France became 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council despite its reduced military capabilities 
and arguably diminished international stature.  Under his leadership, France withdrew 
from NATO’s integrated military structure to pursue a more autonomous foreign and 
defense policy.  Especially noteworthy were the establishment of a French nuclear 
doctrine distinct from American and NATO nuclear doctrine and a doctrine of political 
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and military control that mirrored American doctrine—French armed forces under French 
command.  Often the pursuit of French independence has been perceived to be at the 
expense of American influence and in conflict with greater European integration.  
Subsequent French presidents, notably François Mitterrand, a vehement critic of de 
Gaulle, continued to implement Gaullist defense policies.57 
B. FRENCH ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER AFTER 9/11 
In a December 2001 article President Chirac outlined the impact of his actions 
following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the value of France’s contributions 
to the campaign against international terrorism.  He emphasized his leadership in rallying 
the UN and forming a broad international coalition to combat the threat of terrorism.  
Chirac also underscored his role in rallying the Europeans, noting that France, along with 
its European partners, provided major contributions to the struggle against terrorism, 
specifically in revising legal codes, strengthening law enforcement, and making arrests in 
Europe.  He also noted French diplomatic contributions from Pakistan to Northern Africa.  
Chirac’s conclusions focused on his commitment to French national unity and the 
necessity for international solidarity and intense cultural dialogue to avoid a clash of 
civilizations.58 
In his capacity as the leader of a nuclear power, a permanent member of the 
UNSC, a leader of the drive towards European integration, a key ally in the fight against 
terror, and one of the United States’ oldest allies, President Chirac assumed a public role 
of mentor to an American administration burdened with a poorly-conceived policy 
towards Iraq.  France’s position leading up to the US-led Iraq intervention was consistent 
with its historical behavior.  On one hand, the French government consistently attempted 
to portray itself as one of America’s oldest and most reliable allies.  At the same time, 
Chirac emphasized French autonomy.  France alone would decide whether to act in 
concert with the US-led coalition or to offer it only passive support in conjunction with 
political objections in the UNSC.  Concurrently, the French government professed a 
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devotion to multilateral action, particularly if it enlarged the role of France and Europe in 
the global arena. 
Public policy statements made by President Chirac leading up to the US-led 
intervention in Iraq clarified the current vision of France’s role in the world and its 
perceived relationship with the United States.  In a speech to French ambassadors, Chirac 
outlined his foreign policy objectives in a question and answer format:  Can France 
remain master of its destiny?  Can it make its voice heard in answering the great 
questions facing men today?  He answers, “I am convinced that it can and it must.”59  On 
this basis, he outlined the policy for his ambassadors to pursue.   
It is with this belief and this determination that I assign to our diplomacy 
four principal directions for the coming years:  to achieve decisive 
progress in European construction; to reinforce French security; to work to 
the benefit of peace and democracy and to promote the emergence of a 
humane world more unified and more ecologically responsible.60   
These goals are lofty but consistent with French political culture and France’s world 
view, incorporating a bent to either sustain or improve the nation’s position.   
Before the March 2002 World Trade Summit in Monterrey, Mexico, Chirac 
espoused a nuanced relationship with the United States.  His explanation that France was 
not an ally who was aligned with the United States, but a faithful ally nonetheless 
embodied the evolving discourse on the impending US-led intervention in Iraq.61  This 
position enabled one of America’s staunchest allies, France, to act as a mentor and ally in 
the role of loyal opposition while maintaining autonomy of national action.   
1. Domestic Political Concerns 
Following his May 2002 reelection, President Chirac had few domestic problems 
in reconciling his stance on intervention in Iraq with his foreign policy objectives.  
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Reelected by a considerable margin after a contentious race against radical Front National 
candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen, he was freed from domestic political vulnerability.  The 
focus of his reelection campaign was on internal domestic issues—crime, unemployment, 
and immigration.  This was in particular contrast to German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder’s reelection campaign, one central theme of which was opposition to military 
intervention in Iraq.  In addition, the French electoral system freed Chirac from 
vulnerability to a parliamentary vote of no confidence that could remove him from office, 
unlike British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.  
Thus in a secure position domestically, Chirac had relative latitude to act in a manner 
consistent with his vision of France’s role on the world stage.  In this case, the political 
direction Chirac took—opposing intervention in Iraq unless it was sanctioned by the 
UNSC—was overwhelmingly supported by the French public. 
Of all the European Union countries surveyed by the German Marshall Fund, the 
French public perception of the threat of Iraqi WMD was the lowest in Europe.  43 
percent surveyed perceived Iraqi WMD as a threat, compared with 75 percent in Great 
Britain and 60 percent in Germany.  Attitudes on the use of force in Iraq reflected a 
similar trend.  27 percent of the French population opposed intervention in Iraq while 
another 63 percent supported intervention only after approval from the United Nations 
Security Council.  Only 6 percent of the French supported US unilateral action; the 
average opposition in other EU countries surveyed was about 10 percent in support of 
unilateralism.62  On the question of intervention in Iraq, Chirac’s position concurred with 
popular French inclination, and more generally, reflected public opinion in most 
European countries.  
2. France and the European Union 
The history of France’s relations with its partners in the European Union has been 
contentious.  Initially supportive of greater integration in the European Community, 
President de Gaulle shifted French policy from support to obstruction of certain proposed 
forms of European integration.  Whether this shift was attributable, as Luigi Barzini 
suggests, to “irrational longings” in reaction to “contemporary humiliations and 
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impotence” or to de Gaulle’s desire for independence from British and American 
influence can be argued indefinitely.  De Gaulle’s actions perpetuated the conflict in any 
alliance to which France was a party but not the leader—French independence versus 
unified action.   The result guaranteed that France, despite its perception of itself as the 
light of the civilized world, would not soon be the acknowledged leader of an integrated 
and unified Europe.63 
More contemporaneously, French goals for the EU are directed towards making it 
a world power.  Included in this project is the May 2004 expansion of the EU to twenty-
five members as well as the development of a European Security and Defense Policy 
distinct from (but pursued in cooperation with) NATO.  One stated objective in 
establishing common policies is to provide the EU with the ability to have a dialogue 
with the United States with a single voice.  The ultimate ambition of this policy would be 
to make the EU an equal partner of the United States in areas beyond economic policy.  
In this vision espoused by Védrine, France and Germany would serve as the engine of the 
EU locomotive.64  However, French and German attempts to speak for all of the 
European Union on Iraq were widely opposed.  
Acrimony concerning the proposed US-led intervention was not limited to 
exchanges between the French and American governments.  German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder trenchantly opposed the intervention, to the point of including this opposition 
in his platform in the German national elections in September 2002.  Leaders of the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom signed an open letter in January 2003 supporting the prospective US-led 
intervention in Iraq, delineating the parties in this intra-EU rift.65  French reaction to this 
departure from the established pattern of French-German leadership was hostile, and 
exchanges between the camps shattered any possibility of EU unity on this subject.  
President Chirac went so far as to rebuke certain governments for acting “irresponsibly.”  
[C]oncerning the candidate countries … I think they have behaved with a 
certain levity. Because entering the European Union, that presumes 
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altogether a minimum of consideration for the others, a minimum of 
concentration. If, at the first difficulty, one starts giving one’s own point 
of view independently of coordination with the assembly in which, 
however, one wants to enter, that is not a totally responsible behavior. In 
any case, it is not a well-mannered behavior. Therefore I think they have 
missed a good chance to keep silent. … Therefore I would say that these 
countries have been both ill mannered and a bit unconscious of the 
dangers brought about by a too quick alignment with the American 
position.66 
In this instance, the European Union was not a vehicle by which French power 
could be maximized.  Although the French position regarding Iraq was consistent with 
public opinion across Europe, Chirac was unable to persuade most of his counterparts in 
EU countries to align themselves with France and Germany in opposition to the 
American policy.   
C. AMERICAN THREAT PERCEPTION 
The US National Security Strategy and the White House’s assessment of Iraq’s 
past behavior in the Decade of Defiance and Deception document provided both a 
summary of the Iraq threat in the eyes of the Bush administration and insight concerning 
the extent of the damage wrought by the 11 September 2001 attacks on Americans’ sense 
of security.  Both documents illuminated an activist and interventionist American policy 
regarding Iraq that divided NATO, the EU, and the United Nations. 
The US National Security Strategy redirected America’s post-cold war stance.  
The document acknowledged the value of containment during the Soviet period, but 
decried containment in the case of Iraq.  The Soviet era was contrasted with a more 
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complex and dangerous security environment peopled by “rogue state dictators” and 
terrorists whose objectives include obtaining WMD.  
The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our 
allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, 
producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. … But new 
deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists.  None of 
these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was 
arrayed against us by the Soviet Union.  However, the nature and 
motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain 
destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, 
and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction 
against us, make today’s security environment more complex and 
dangerous.67   
In addition to devaluing containment, the new threat brought with it a sense of 
immediacy.  Thus preemption was necessary due to the nature of the adversaries at hand. 
It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this 
new threat.  Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United 
States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the 
past.  The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s 
threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our 
adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option.  We cannot let 
our enemies strike first. 68    
The administration advocated preemptive actions, should they be necessary, to 
avert a future attack against the United States.  
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and 
objectives of today’s adversaries.  Rogue states and terrorists do not seek 
to attack us using conventional means. … To forestall or prevent such 
hostile acts by our adversaries the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.69 
The US National Security Strategy shifted the American focus from containment 
to preemption while accentuating the imminence of the global terrorism threat.  A Decade 
of Deception and Defiance focused attention on Iraq’s role in the imminent threat.  This 
analysis enumerated UN resolutions that Iraq had ignored or violated; the possession of 
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chemical and biological agents and a demonstrated willingness to employ them; the 
continued pursuit of fissile material; the retention of prohibited missiles; the repression of 
Iraqi citizens; the refusal to account for Gulf War prisoners; and efforts to circumvent the 
oil-for-food program and economic sanctions.  Based on this analysis, President Bush 
urged the UN to take action to prevent further WMD proliferation in Iraq.70 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s remarks to the UNSC incorporated all elements 
of the Bush administration’s argument for intervention in Iraq.  He constructed a case for 
immediate intervention in Iraq based on US threat assessments and the alleged inefficacy 
of the weapons inspection regime.  Addressing the role of the weapons inspectors, he 
placed the blame at the Iraqi regime’s doorstep:  “Inspectors are inspectors; they are not 
detectives.”  Powell quoted Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC:  “Iraq 
appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament 
which was demanded of it.”  Powell summarized the Bush administration’s position with 
the following conclusions:  that three months previously, the UNSC had recognized the 
threat that Iraq posed to international peace and security; that Iraq then had been in 
material breach of UNSC resolutions and had remained so subsequently; that this 
continued intransigence hastened the advent of serious consequences; that UNSCR 1441 
had been composed as a last-ditch effort to avoid armed intervention in Iraq; and that 
actions by the Iraqi regime flouting the provisions of UNSCR 1441 were undermining 
those chances.71 
From the inclusion of Iraq in the “axis of evil” in President Bush’s January 2002 
State of the Union Address through Secretary Powell’s February 2003 UNSC speech, 
American analyses presented the Iraqi threat as “grave and growing,” especially in view 
of the possibility that Saddam Hussein might transfer WMD to interested terrorist 
organizations—specifically Al Qaeda.72  From the Bush administration’s perspective, 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq constituted an imminent threat which required 
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immediate “preemptive” military action to safeguard the security of the United States and 
the rest of the world. 
In other words, the Bush administration’s threat analysis tended to consolidate 
various aspects of terrorism in the concept of the global war on terror—including Iraq, Al 
Qaeda, Hamas and other regimes and organizations.  Defining the intervention to bring 
about regime change in Iraq as a component of the Global War on Terrorism was the 
Bush administration’s ultimate justification for the proposed intervention.73 
D. FRENCH THREAT PERCEPTION 
In comparison with the Bush administration’s approach, the French analysis 
focused on discrete threats which had to be addressed by specific methods.  Thus, the 
issue of Iraq was not depicted as an element in the global war on terrorism, but as a 
specific threat.  Other threats included globalization and poverty, regional crises, WMD 
proliferation, and international terrorism.  Each of these threats had distinct origins and 
required particular solutions that needed to be crafted and pursued.  The French approach 
to Iraq supported maintaining a containment arrangement that was deemed satisfactory, 
while the Americans favored an interventionist approach. 
Iraq as a threat to the United States or the global order entered the French national 
dialogue only after much coverage by the US press and President Bush’s administration.  
In August 2002 Chirac alluded to the threat of terrorism and WMD, noting that terrorism 
was not the only global menace, and that the world needed to focus on other threats such 
as poverty, WMD proliferation, and regional crises such as the Israel-Palestine conflict.  
While acknowledging the danger of terrorism and WMD proliferation, he noted that there 
is more than one course of appropriate action for addressing these threats—including a 
possible military response—but focused on actions and policies that could prevent the 
advent of terrorists.   
But terrorism is not the only threat and the world should not organize itself 
solely around a response [to that threat]. … The danger arising from 
weapons of mass destruction comes also from certain countries and it [the 
danger] is growing.  I have already had occasion to say it, [but] there is 
more than one way to address it.  It is therefore essential to act through 
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prevention and, in the last resort, to bring into play the assurance that 
deterrence offers us.74   
To reduce the likelihood of WMD proliferation, Chirac proposed an international 
system of prevention through monitoring which he defended as not the product of naïveté 
but an effective system.  He also admonished the United States to consider the value of 
multilateralism in pursuing global objectives such as preventing WMD proliferation. 
In an 8 September 2002 interview, Chirac, in contrast to the US administration, 
seemed uncertain as to the existence of Iraqi WMD:  “I’m not saying it doesn’t exist, I’m 
simply saying that I haven’t seen any [evidence].”  When queried about Saddam Hussein, 
Chirac averred that Hussein was clearly a dangerous man to his own people, and as such 
merited international monitoring.  However, he disavowed any perception of a threat by 
Saddam Hussein to France, or to anyone at all outside Iraq.  He denied any knowledge of 
links between Al Qaeda and Iraq specifically or between Iraq and international terrorism 
generally.  The most revealing portion of this interview illustrated the difference between 
French and American threat assessments.  It was this observation by Chirac:   
When Saddam Hussein and his regime are a danger to the outside, that’s 
when we have to act.  But first, we must be sure there’s a danger.  If he’s 
not a danger, however, and he’s only Iraq’s problem, then it’s not our 
problem.75 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, addressed the 
UNSC nine days after Secretary Powell.  His comments were a point-by-point response 
to the arguments presented by Powell.  Where Powell disparaged the efficacy of weapons 
inspections, Villepin affirmed their impact, maintaining that they had established positive 
control of Iraqi WMD.  Where Powell reviewed evidence of Iraqi obstruction, Villepin 
cited incremental improvements in Iraqi cooperation.  Powell submitted evidence of links 
between Iraq and international terrorism:  
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But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much 
more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, a 
nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of 
murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu 
Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and 
his Al Qaeda lieutenants. … When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the 
Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training 
center camp. And this is located in northeastern Iraq. 76   
Villepin replied,  
Ten days ago, the US Secretary of State, Mr. Powell, reported the alleged 
links between Al Qaeda and the regime in Baghdad.  Given the present 
state of our research and intelligence, in liaison with our allies, nothing 
allows us to establish such links.77  
 While the Bush administration’s public statements became more insistent in 
linking Iraq with an imminent threat of attack and the possible transfer to terrorists of 
WMD, the French statements continually disputed this connection.  Chirac asserted that it 
was “probable” that Saddam Hussein had WMD,78 but that he might not have them, in 
contrast with the American administration’s certainty that he did. Chirac’s assessment 
was that Saddam was no threat to anyone beyond Iraqi borders, while the Bush 
administration held that the danger of attack, perhaps by terrorists armed with Iraqi 
WMD, was imminent.   
While the Bush administration reiterated the danger of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, Chirac repeatedly pointed to the danger posed by American 
unilateralism and the potential for wider negative consequences, including instability in 
the Middle East.  
I’m utterly opposed to unilateralism in the modern world. … Now we 
must be very careful. This coalition remains necessary to fight against 
terrorism. Necessary. Especially given the currents of opposition to 
Western countries which are becoming more and more prevalent in poor 
and emerging countries. This coalition must be managed cautiously. 
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That’s why I think everything should be done to ensure that the coalition 
isn’t jeopardized by an act that doesn’t have the approval of the 
international community and Muslim countries.79  
E. THREAT OF IRAQI WMD VERSUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER 
Throughout the French public policy discussion the overwhelming concern 
regarding intervention in Iraq was not directed towards the threat from Iraq, WMD, or the 
decision-making of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.  Instead, the primary focus of the 
French discourse concerned the potential demise of a multilateral order in favor of what 
was portrayed as US unilateralism. France remained concerned about the rights of the 
sovereign nation and the preservation of the supremacy of international law, and held that 
these principles required an additional UNSC Resolution explicitly authorizing the use of 
force.  
The Bush Administration’s public policy focused consistently on the Iraqi 
component of the threat to international security.  To forestall an attack on American soil, 
the Bush administration held, it was imperative to take the fight to the enemy, wherever 
he could be found.  Iraq was a stationary target compared to the elusive Osama bin 
Laden.  The American public’s support for military action in Iraq was nonetheless not as 
strong as might have been expected based on the Bush administration’s approach.  
Approximately 13 percent of the US public opposed military intervention under any 
circumstances, and another 65 percent supported intervention only under the auspices of 
the UNSC. 80  Nonetheless, many Americans believed that Iraq was connected to the 11 
September 2001 attacks, and that it merited immediate attention.  According to a Pew 
Research Center poll, 66 percent of Americans surveyed in October 2002 believed 
Saddam Hussein had a direct role in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, and in a 20 
February 2003 poll, 57 percent of respondents believed it as well.81   
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The divergences in assessments of Iraq derived from two distinct approaches to 
the problem.  The American analysis interpreted Iraqi WMD as a threat to the world, and 
Saddam Hussein’s defiance of UNSC resolutions as a threat to international order.  In 
contraposition, the French concern was that the threat of Iraqi WMD paled in comparison 
to the damage that might be done to the current international order by a US-led coalition 
in taking action against the Iraqi regime without an additional UNSC resolution explicitly 
authorizing the use of force.   
F. SUMMARY 
A vital lesson President Chirac drew from the attacks of 11 September 2001 was 
the value of solidarity and interdependence in the international order.  American 
“unilateralism,” the French argued, might fundamentally undermine the current 
international order.  French consciousness of France’s position in that order, as one of the 
five permanent members of the UNSC, was probably one of the foundations of France’s 
objections to the American-led military intervention in Iraq.  From a French perspective, 
American influence with individual EU countries further disrupted evolving EU 
solidarity, threatening French efforts to lead the EU in a direction more independent of 
US influence.  
France’s view of its role during the Iraq crisis was consistent with its long-held 
self-image—that of a global nuclear power that serves as one of five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council.  When other global powers, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, took action without sufficient UNSC authority in French eyes, the French 
reflex was to consider how that action affected the French position and international 
image. Whenever UK and US action skirted UNSC authority, the French held, the role of 
the UNSC, its value and authority, were diminished.  If the UNSC role was diminished, 
French international influence was reduced.    
The debate over “preemptive” or “unilateral” action and over the requirement for 
additional explicit UNSC approval for multilateral action in Iraq involved deeper issues.  
Those issues included the future of the EU and its role in world politics.  The pivotal 
questions included political leadership in the EU and its future military security.   
An additional threat to French influence surfaced inside the EU.  The British-
Spanish-led group of EU countries supporting the American position isolated the 
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traditional Franco-German leadership, frustrated President Chirac, and illuminated 
internal EU divisions.82  
Chirac has espoused multipolarity as in France’s long-term strategic interest.  One 
of the central components of his vision of multipolarity was an emerging global role for a 
strong, independent European Union--ideally led by a Franco-German coalition.  
Although he recognized that American dominance was currently unassailable, Chirac’s 
evident intent was that an independent EU would act as a balancing force to American 
power.  He justified this position by noting that the existence of a single “hyperpower” 
could be dangerous.   
This review of the factors influencing French decisions is not comprehensive. 
Additional factors that deserve consideration include French economic interests and 
possible sales of French armaments.  However, France’s national security interests were 
well articulated; it is unlikely that Chirac would allow private sector economic concerns 
to influence the definition of the nation’s policy when he believed French security to be 
threatened.     
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IV. KEY DETERMINANTS-ITALY 
Relations between Italy and the United States cannot easily be characterized.  An 
apt description might include periods of “intense interest” followed by “benign neglect.”   
From the 1930s to the 1980s Italy’s domestic political scene hosted the largest and most 
vibrant non-governing communist party in the world.  During the Cold War, Italy 
maintained cordial relations with East Bloc neighbors, while concurrently remaining a 
steadfast US and NATO ally.  Once Italy’s entrance into NATO was approved by the 
Italian parliament American political interest in Italy waned.83  It waxed whenever Rome 
could substantially contribute to the solution of US and Alliance strategic challenges, for 
instance, in the late 1950s and in the early 1980s.  During the years of post-Sputnik 
anxiety, Italy hosted US Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM).  During 
the intermediate-range nuclear missile crisis in the early 1980s, Italy agreed to host the 
deployment of US cruise missiles. 
Viewed against the backdrop of these historic relations, wherein Italy was 
sometimes considered a marginal player, owing in part to its low level of spending on 
military equipment, it was at first glance surprising that one of President Bush’s most 
vocal allies in the months preceding the American-led intervention in Iraq was the Italian 
Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi.  In adopting this position, Berlusconi assumed 
political risks by opposing domestic popular opinion as well as flouting the position 
adopted by two prominent European leaders, France’s President Chirac and Germany’s 
Chancellor Schroeder. 
Prime Minister Berlusconi’s decision to support the prospective US-led 
intervention in Iraq appears to have been influenced by various domestic and foreign 
policy factors.  His position was articulated in concert with the leaders of Britain, Poland, 
and Spain and in opposition to the Franco-German position.  However, Italian 
participation in the offensive aspects of Operation Iraqi Freedom was restricted to 
logistical support such as basing US forces on Italian territory and allowing over-flights 
of Italian airspace.  Thus, Berlusconi’s support of the American position, while staunch 
                                                 
83 John W. Holmes, “Can Italy Change Yet Remain Stable?”  Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1993, 
pp. 57-68. 
 46
and vocal, did not demand the same political capital as that of Britain’s Prime Minister, 
who sent forces into combat.   
This chapter reviews the recent history of Italian political evolution, examines the 
political and strategic vision of the Berlusconi government, and considers how these 
factors may have influenced Berlusconi’s decision to support the American-led 
intervention.  Berlusconi’s personal identification with American President George Bush 
has elicited much discussion. This chapter also examines the variations between the 
Italian and American threat assessments that reinforced Italy’s action orientation.  
Although Berlusconi cited Iraqi WMD as a threat to Italian and global security, other 
Italian threat assessments, such as the Italian defense ministry’s white book, focused on 
issues of regional instability and international terrorism.  It appears that Berlusconi’s 
inclusion of the Iraq WMD threat reflected new assessments.  Finally, the chapter offers 
conclusions about the future of relations between Italy and the United States, as well as 
the Italian role in international politics. 
A. ITALIAN POLITICAL CULTURE  
The Italian peninsula was united by the armies of the king of Piedmont-Sardinia, 
aided by the political machinations of Count Cavour and the revolutionary armies of 
Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini.  The principal obstacles to the unification of 
Italy were the Vatican, Austria and Spain.  The post-medieval political history of the 
Italian peninsula is that of independent city-states with competing commercial interests 
and political allegiances, and unique systems of self-governance.  In varying eras, city-
states had been dominated by Austria (in the north), the Papal States (in the center) and 
scions of either the Spanish or French monarchies (in the south).  Traditions of art, 
architecture, and political thought evolved in city-states connected—very loosely—by 
cultural and linguistic ties and geographic proximity.    
The wars of Italian unification occurred over the course of the nineteenth century.  
Early uprisings between 1820 and 1830 were quashed by the Austrian army.  As 
movements for political unification gained adherents and popular appeal, the successive 
wars in 1848, 1861 and 1870 led to the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy.  The 
diverse forces and political theorists contributing to both political and military success are 
often represented by three key figures. 
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Giuseppe Mazzini was an ardent republican who fought to unify Italy as a 
republic rather than a kingdom. Giuseppe Garibaldi was a revolutionary and a socialist 
whose military expedition of 1860 toppled the rule of Francis II, the last monarch of the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Sicily and Naples).  Count Camillo di Cavour 
masterminded the political alliance between Piedmont and France against the Austrians 
that led to the successful rebellion and proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy.84  The 
interaction between these differing perspectives on the optimal nature of governance in a 
unified Italy—socialist, republican or monarchist—have subsequently exerted varying 
degrees of influence over Italian domestic political activity and identity. 
1. Impact of Papacy 
That the Papal See was located in Rome added a dimension of complexity to the 
politics of the Italian peninsula, both before and after unification.  Popes had been the 
temporal sovereigns over a large swath of the central Italian peninsula for over a 
millennium—from 754 to 1870.  Anti-clerical sentiments popularized during and after the 
French Revolution made this situation increasingly problematic during the nineteenth 
century as the popes had to contend with and ultimately suppress revolutionist 
movements with Austrian and French assistance.  In 1870, King Victor Emmanuel II 
seized the opportunity presented by the defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian war 
and invaded the Papal States and annexed them to the rest of Italy.  Thus, Italy was 
unified at the expense of the Papal States.   
Pope Pius IX declared himself a “prisoner” of the Italian monarch and 
excommunicated those who had participated in the Italian annexation of the Papal States.  
In another attempt to exert spiritual power in politics, the Pope enjoined Catholics to 
oppose the king’s efforts at unification and encouraged electoral boycotts.  This pastoral 
guidance had multiple effects.  Sermons by the Italian clergy against the government 
reduced popular participation.  The new government retaliated by circumscribing church 
gatherings if they involved political activity. 
 Throughout this period, Pope Pius IX encouraged other European powers to 
intervene in order to restore the Papal Territories.  That the Italian government allowed 
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him (and the curia) wide latitude in articulating such appeals lessened the concerns of 
other European leaders and eliminated any chance of outside intervention.  This state of 
siege between the Vatican and the Italian government went unresolved until the Lateran 
Treaty of 1929.85  
Despite a reduction in the temporal power of the papacy, individual pontiffs have 
used their position as the moral and spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church to 
influence Italian politicians.  Since he took office in 1978, Pope John Paul II has 
consistently encouraged national leaders to find methods other than war to resolve 
disputes.  In the instance of the first Gulf War, the Pope’s exhortation for a peaceful 
solution to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait resonated across Italian political parties, finding 
support equally among both the Catholic and the Communist parties.86 
Pope John Paul II addressed the Italian Parliament in November 2002.  Many of 
his words reinforced domestic concerns highlighted already by Prime Minister 
Berlusconi, including the declining birthrate and the erosion of family values.  
Addressing the ongoing international wrangling over courses of action in Iraq, the Pontiff 
urged an increased attention to “concord, solidarity and peace between the nations.”  He 
deplored the ongoing violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories as well as the ill 
effects of international terrorism on the world’s major religions.87 
The Pope opposed the push to use force to disarm Iraq.  His articulated concerns 
paralleled many of those expressed by President Chirac.  That is, evidence of the 
existence of WMD was dubious, and war in Iraq could provoke wider regional 
instability.88 
Following US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 2003 presentation to the 
UN Security Council about Iraq’s noncompliance with the UNSC’s disarmament 
objectives, the Vatican response was scathing in its assessment of the Bush 
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administration’s policy, the paucity of credible proof, and Prime Minister Berlusconi’s 
uncritical support for the Bush Administration’s proposed actions.  Monsignor Renato 
Martino, President of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, dismissed as 
unimpressive the evidence of Iraq’s ties to international terrorism or its possession of 
WMD in quantities that would constitute a threat to humanity.  Furthermore, he indicated 
that the gravest danger in this particular crisis was posed by the Bush administration.  He 
asserted that “if Washington goes to war in spite of a veto in the Security Council, this 
will bring about the destruction of the United Nations.”   He further highlighted Prime 
Minister Berlusconi’s deficiencies in insistently supporting the American position.89 
The pope had two primary goals.  The first was to avert war by influencing 
national leaders on the American-led side of the debate to reconsider military intervention 
as a viable solution.  The second was to ensure that intervention in Iraq did not lead to a 
war between Islam and Christianity.  That attacks against Iraqi Christians were minimal 
until mid-2004 is seen as a success in this regard.90 
In March 2003, Prime Minister Berlusconi attended a last-minute meeting with 
the Pope about the prospective events in Iraq.  It is impossible to concretely assess the 
effects of the Pope’s objections to a military intervention in Iraq on the Italian Prime 
Minister’s decision.  However, the Pope’s position bolstered the arguments of many of 
Berlusconi’s opponents, whether under the guise of pacifism or opposition to the 
American position.  This may have combined with other factors such as public 
opposition, causing Berlusconi to adopt a moderate stance between the British and 
French positions.       
2. Fascism and Mussolini 
The ascendancy of fascism as a political movement in Italy following the First 
World War helped to shape the course of domestic politics in Italy following the Second 
World War.  Some of the unique features of Italian democracy are attributable to the 
backlash from Mussolini’s dictatorship.    
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Mussolini got Italy into the war on the losing side.  Following Mussolini’s ouster 
in July 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III and Prime Minister Pietro Badoglio surrendered 
to the Allies, declared war on Germany, and gained recognition by the Allies as a 
cobelligerent against Germany.  Divided by German occupation in the North and the 
Allied military presence in the South, Italy’s regions cobbled together functioning local 
governments.  The coalition that governed Italy between 1944 and 1948 was one of 
strange bedfellows, whose primary links consisted of shared antipathy for Mussolini 
rather than a coherent policy for post-war Italy.  The parties to this coalition included the 
PCI—the Italian Communist Party, the politics and pro-Soviet orientation of which 
caused anxiety to American leaders.  
Having experienced the effects of a strong central government with power 
concentrated in the hands of a single individual, the post-war government of Italy was 
designed to diffuse power—that is, to be weak—and to prevent a repetition.  Rather than 
a strong national leader, the President of the Republic and the Presidente del Consiglio 
dei Ministri (customarily known in English as the Prime Minister) had little real authority 
and power.  Power was instead diffused through the Parliament by means of coalitions of 
political party leaders.91  The shifting coalitions made the takeover by a single strong 
leader difficult, and instead promoted inefficiency, and ultimately, corruption.  Because 
national governments needed to cater to diverse constituencies to retain power, they 
rarely articulated or implemented strong domestic or international policies. 
World War II ended Italy’s Fascist experiment and ushered in a new political era 
following a plebiscite in 1946 redesignating Italy a republic instead of a monarchy.  Two 
key factors influenced Italian political developments during the post-war era:  Allied 
occupation and anti-Fascist alliances formed during the resistance.  The resistance created 
links between communists, socialists, Catholics and democrats, all of whom aspired to 
shape the nation and therefore formed a series of coalition governments between June 
1945 and May 1947.  American political preoccupations with the strength of the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI), particularly with its links to the Soviet Communist Party, caused 
the US government to act to counter its influence.  American actions included 
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decelerating the withdrawal of US troops and contributing large donations to the 
Christian Democrats, coupled with threats of terminating Marshall Plan funding should 
the PCI win the election.92    
The result was that the Christian Democratic Party won over 48 percent of the 
electoral vote while the Socialists and the Italian Communist Party together won 31 
percent, pushing the PCI into the opposition.93  The Christian Democrats, with the 
support of the Vatican and the Allies, assumed leadership of the Italian government.  The 
Christian Democrats participated in every coalition government from June 1945 to June 
1992, and usually held the post of Prime Minister (notable exceptions included Giovanni 
Spadolini, a Republican, from July 1981 to December 1982, and Bettino Craxi, a 
Socialist, from August 1983 to April 1987).  The Communist Party was excluded from 
governing coalitions after May 1947 despite earning a consistently large percentage of 
the popular vote.94 
3. Current Domestic Political Issues 
Events in 1989 ushered in the first in a series of changes that altered the Italian 
domestic political landscape.  The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the 
Soviet Union precipitated rifts in the internal structure of the Italian Communist Party, 
which then split into two factions, one with a moderate political agenda and the other 
with a more hard-line approach.  The collapse of Soviet communism eliminated pressure 
to formally exclude Italian Communists from the central government. These events 
fostered the growth of several new political parties.95    
The second change occurred between 1992 and 1994 as the political structure that 
had existed since 1948 imploded.  Italian politicians and businessmen, primarily 
associated with the Christian Democrats, were indicted for corruption in large numbers.  
The scandal and electoral backlash resulted in the dissolution of the existing political 
order and the disappearance of most major politicians from Italian politics through 
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criminal convictions, disgrace or exile.96  For the first time since 1947, Italian voters had 
the opportunity to elect alternates to Christian Democrat-based coalitions, but the only 
parties to escape the corruption charges with their political bases and elites intact were of 
the left.   
With the political elite in shambles and the reformed Communist Party (now 
called PDS-Partito Democratici di Sinistra, Democratic Party of the Left) poised to enter 
a coalition government, new politicians and political parties emerged.  One of these 
parties, the Lega Nord (Northern League), espoused the re-division of Italy into northern 
and southern countries and made strong showings in regional elections in 1992 and 1994.  
The former Fascist Party, first named the Italian Social Movement and subsequently the 
National Alliance, emerged in Sicily as a regional power in 1992.97   
A series of short-lived governments rose and fell based on unstable alliances.  
One such government was the seven-month reign of Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 as the 
leader of a new party, Forza Italia.  Berlusconi forged a tenuous alliance with the leaders 
of the Lega Nord and the National Alliance on a platform of anti-communism, political 
and economic reform, and streamlined government.  “Berlusconi, a virulent anti-
Communist, says he entered politics to short-circuit a likely election victory of a left-
wing alliance led by the former Italian Communist Party.”98  Berlusconi’s alliance 
ultimately appealed to moderates concerned about a win by the left as well as voters 
repudiating the scandals of the previously ruling parties.  
Berlusconi’s election shattered the political establishment.  The alliance won 
pluralities for both chambers of the Italian parliament followed closely by the success of 
the PDS.  Centrist parties, including former Christian Democrats, earned only about 16 
percent of the popular vote.  According to a contemporary report,  
Berlusconi promises the first unabashedly free-market government in Italy 
since World War II.  Outlining his policies to reporters on Thursday, the 
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Milan entrepreneur promised economic renewal through new investment, 
more jobs, reduced government spending and debt and tax reform.99 
Although his government survived only seven months due to the defection of 
Lega Nord leader Umberto Bossi, during the years from 1994 to 2001 Berlusconi proved 
himself to be a credible politician rather than a wealthy dilettante.  In contrast, the 
opposition center-left politicians have struggled to build and maintain effective coalition 
governments.  During the period from 1994 to 2001 the center-left fielded three prime 
ministers (Romano Prodi, Massimo d’Alema, and Giuliano Amato), and in the elections 
against Berlusconi in 2001 had nominated a fourth candidate to lead the coalition. 
Italian general elections on 13 May 2001 pitted Berlusconi’s center-right coalition 
of Forza Italia, Lega Nord, and the National Alliance against the center-left coalition 
headed by the former mayor of Rome, Francesco Rutelli.  Berlusconi campaigned on a 
platform similar to that of his 1994 campaign.  He also argued for closer relations with 
the United States, and championed economic liberalization, tax reductions, and market 
reforms.100  
Berlusconi’s alliance with the Lega Nord and the National Alliance revived 
questions over Italy’s place in the European Union.  Concern over the possible renewal of 
fascism in Italy as well as rumors about Berlusconi’s business dealings provided a 
platform for critics in other European countries to attack him and to try to influence the 
outcome of the election.101  Despite negative publicity, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia won a 
clear plurality of the election (30 percent of the vote) while his allies in the Lega Nord 
and the National Alliance lost votes, rendering his leading position in the coalition more 
secure against the vacillations or machinations of his allies.102  Although Berlusconi’s 
election represented the culmination of a series of electoral upheavals, this popular 
mandate still did not equate to a strong central government.  Thus, the nature of the 
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Italian central government would hamper his ability to implement policies unimpeded by 
divergent interests. 
B. BERLUSCONI’S DOMESTIC POLICY 
The diffusion of power in the Italian central government resulted in the 
domination of political parties that were constrained to form unstable coalitions.  This led 
to the frequent collapse of ruling coalitions as individual members exited the government 
based on local or personal interests.  For the Italian political establishment, this central 
instability led to the collapse and restructuring of approximately 50 government 
coalitions after 1948.  It should be noted that, although the composition of the 
governments changed frequently, individuals often held the same portfolio through 
successive governments, or alternatively were moved to various ministries depending on 
the makeup of the particular government. 
One of Berlusconi’s goals was to maintain his coalition and remain as Prime 
Minister for his full 5-year term of office.  If he were to succeed in doing this, it would be 
an unprecedented achievement in Italy’s post-war history.103  In early 2001, candidate 
Berlusconi outlined in an open letter to the Italian people both his critique of the then-
governing coalition and his vision for the future of Italy.  His electoral proposals focused 
on three principal issues that hindered domestic progress and international recognition:  
stagnation of the Italian economy, inefficiency in the Italian public sector, and the lack of 
personal security due to an increasing crime rate.  His electoral platform was based on 
five precepts--family, development, federalism, security, and Italy’s European and 
Western destinies. 
A brief overview of each of these planks in Berlusconi’s platform reveals a set of 
values similar to those espoused by George W. Bush during his electoral campaign in 
2000.  Berlusconi called the family “the natural arena through which fundamental moral 
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and civic values are passed, a large component of social cohesion and solidarity, and the 
guarantor of our country’s future.”104   
He criticized Prime Minister Giuliano Amato’s administration for failing to 
advance a coherent domestic or foreign policy agenda, which (he alleged) condemned 
Italy to being the economic laggard in Europe.  His critiques included the increasing 
public debt, youth unemployment, inefficient public administration, lack of foreign 
investment and declining economic liberty.105 
Regarding federalism and government reform, Berlusconi highlighted his concept 
of the role of the state and its relationship to society.  Specifically, he viewed the state as 
the guarantor rather than the originator of rights, differentiating between the citizens as 
the source of state sovereignty or as subjects of the state.  His reform proposals included 
increasing the efficiency of the central government through a program of modernization 
combined with decentralization and devolution of jurisdiction of the central government 
either up to the European Union or down to regional governments.106 
According to Berlusconi, the Italian state was losing legitimacy in the critical area 
of national security.  “Ensuring the security of people and property constituted the 
fundamental contract between citizens and government, without which the state would 
lose its historic and moral legitimacy.”  He opined that the nation was becoming less 
secure as the direct result of government failures to protect citizens from crime.  One of 
his critical election themes was reasserting the state’s ability to deter crime as well as to 
apprehend and prosecute criminals.  Two issues he indicated as sources of particular 
concern were illegal immigration, which he proposed to alleviate by establishing 
improved immigration controls; and drug trafficking, particularly with its links to 
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organized crime.  These challenges he proposed to combat through rigorous deterrence, 
prevention, and repression.107 
Berlusconi’s vision for Italy’s role in Europe and the West was elaborated as 
follows.  After saluting the key components of post-World War II Italian international 
policy—participation in European integration, loyalty to NATO, and close relations with 
the United States—he asserted that this policy must continue.  Further, he contrasted his 
vision of Italy’s and Europe’s future—primacy of individual rights, and the role of 
government as a tool of the citizen—with those of his center-left socialist and statist 
opponents, who, he contended, envisioned the state as predominant, with the citizen 
under its dominion.  The crux of this differentiation focused on his proposed solutions to 
Italian and European Union problems.  He asserted that the results of leftist-socialist 
leadership included decreasing prosperity, increasing unemployment, capital flight, and 
the euro’s loss of value in relation to the dollar.  Berlusconi offered four 
recommendations:  (1) to promote a liberal European constitution while respecting the 
principle of subsidiarity; (2) to create conditions for economic, job, and social growth; (3) 
to find new ways to collaborate with the US, particularly in the defense sector; and (4) to 
develop new methods of socio-economic cooperation with states neighboring the EU as 
disincentives to illegal immigration.108 
  On 7 May 2001 Berlusconi signed a “Contract with the Italians” reminiscent of 
the Republican Party’s “Contract with America” program in the 1994 election.  In this 
contract, Berlusconi articulated five goals he intended to achieve, should he be elected, 
during his five-year term. 
• Demolishing fiscal pressure through target reductions in income tax brackets 
and abolition of inheritance and gift taxes 
• Implementing measures to reduce crime and increase individual security  
• Increasing minimum pensions 
• Halving the unemployment rate by creating 1.5 million new jobs 
• Opening up 40 percent of public works contracts 
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An interesting aspect of Berlusconi’s contract was his promise not to present himself for 
reelection at the end of his five year term should four out of his five goals not be 
achieved.109 
In his end-of-year review of his government’s progress on 30 December 2002, 
Prime Minister Berlusconi made only passing mention of issues of foreign policy, 
including the prospective US-led intervention in Iraq, despite the heated rhetoric between 
the Bush administration and the governments of Germany and France.  Instead, he 
provided a comprehensive progress report on his government’s achievements with regard 
to his “Contract with the Italians.”  He recounted successes—the abolition of inheritance 
and gift taxes; reductions in tax rates in target income brackets; a 15 percent reduction in 
the homicide rate; an increase in pensions; and the creation of 234,000 new jobs.  He also 
introduced areas for further improvement:  increased infrastructure, and additional fiscal, 
labor and bureaucratic reforms.110   
Prime Minister Berlusconi won the 2001 elections based a combination of two 
factors: his domestic policy agenda and a backlash against the parties of the left.  While 
President Bush and President Chirac were concerned with decision-making on Iraq, 
Berlusconi was much more focused on corralling the divergent interests of his coalition 
to execute his economic and domestic security policies. 
C. BERLUSCONI’S FOREIGN POLICY 
After World War II, Italian foreign policy was generally directed towards three 
specific areas:  Europe, the Mediterranean, and the United States.  The effects of Italy’s 
experience with Mussolini included eager participation in the European integration 
movement.  In the security domain, Italy became a steady and reliable US ally, 
sometimes regarded as a consumer rather than producer of security.  Berlusconi’s vision 
for Italian foreign policy envisaged continuity with these post-war traditions and yet with 
a more prominent role for Italy: this complemented his ambitious domestic agenda.   
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Italy was one of the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome and a key 
component of the evolving European Community.  Successive Italian politicians have 
supported the construction of an integrated Europe and have sought recognition as being 
among the elite of European leaders from Britain, France, and Germany.  Economic 
growth in the 1980s did not continue through the 1990s.  As Italy’s economy decelerated, 
it lost its position of first-tier leadership, and questions were raised about whether Italy 
would be able to join the European Monetary Union.111  Berlusconi’s foreign policy 
involved reasserting Italian leadership in Europe while reaffirming his support for a 
strong European Union with a capability to act in a united manner on issues such as 
globalization, capital and trade flows, and security and defense. 
Italy’s ability to reenter the ranks of European leadership and influence the 
direction of the European Union depended on certain economic and political factors.  
First, Berlusconi needed to convince his peers that he was not a eurosceptic.  Second, he 
needed to rein in Italian economic imbalances. Berlusconi expended considerable effort 
to reassure both domestic and European audiences of his intention to maintain Italy’s role 
as an active participant in the European Union.  He articulated his views and action plans 
in his campaign literature, and agreed to interviews in British and French newspapers to 
communicate his key messages.   
An integrated economic policy required disrupting long-standing patronage 
relationships between particular sectors of the economy and the ministries set up to 
regulate them.  Berlusconi’s reform of the Italian public sector through government 
restructuring and privatization would be facilitated by cooperation—and pressure—from 
other EU members.112 
Berlusconi also reaffirmed his intention to strengthen the ties between Italy and 
the United States as a part of Italian security strategy.  Since the beginning of the Cold 
War, American military capability has comprised an important portion of Italian security 
policy.  After the threat of a Soviet invasion disappeared, NATO Europe’s need for 
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American security guarantees diminished, despite the greater prominence of terrorism 
and WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War security environment.  European-American 
security links were undermined by various factors in addition to decreased Allied 
dependence on US protection.  First, the anticipated results of the peace dividend led to 
cutbacks in Allied defense spending.  Second, American interests shifted to other regions, 
particularly after the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War.  Third, the growing gap between 
American and European military capabilities signified mounting obstacles to successful 
combined operations.113  To prevent a further erosion of trans-Atlantic security links, 
Berlusconi articulated a plan to reenergize and reinforce Italian-American relations, 
particularly with regard to economic and military security affairs. 
Berlusconi’s interest in North Africa continued a traditional Italian focus on the 
Mediterranean region.  His policy integrated a plan for developed nations, such as 
members of the EU, to assist under-developed nations in North Africa to pursue 
democracy and to fight poverty, disease, illiteracy and hunger.  The genesis of 
Berlusconi’s plan can be traced to economic and security factors.  African countries have 
long been Italian trading partners.  More importantly, illegal immigration by Africans 
migrating to Italy to escape civil unrest or to find employment constituted sources of 
instability and increased crime in Italy.  Berlusconi’s proposed solutions to this problem 
involved a combination of domestic initiatives aimed at more effectively controlling 
immigration and a multilateral approach to improving conditions in Africa.114        
Before the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, 
decreasing illegal immigration and promoting international economic development were 
the foci of Prime Minister Berlusconi’s foreign policy.  Following the attacks, Berlusconi 
continued to emphasize an Italian leadership role in the fight against poverty.  However, 
he adapted his approach to the eradication of poverty and the introduction of democracy 
and liberal market economies.  In addition to stabilizing underdeveloped countries 
domestically, these contributions would (it was hoped) reduce the impetus for 
terrorism.115  His 25 September 2002 speech in the Chamber of Deputies clarified his 
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reasons for joining the American-led coalition against terrorism as a natural extension of 
Italian national interests and values. Berlusconi highlighted the results of the coalition’s 
actions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan – the elimination of that regime and the 
eradication of Osama bin Laden’s terrorist bases in that country – in addition to the 
increased cooperation in Europe in intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Italian 
contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom elevated Italy to the third place in the 
world in the number of troops involved in UN-authorized peacekeeping operations. 
Berlusconi described involvement in Afghanistan as an important component of the 
Italian contribution to global security, stability and peace, and also as necessary to ensure 
continued Italian security.116 
  One of Prime Minister Berlusconi’s foreign policy goals was to raise Italy’s 
international profile.  This included three specific areas of Italian interest:  the European 
Union, the Mediterranean region (particularly southern Europe and North Africa), and the 
world at large.  In a January 2002 interview with The Times of London, primarily 
defending himself against charges of Euroscepticism, Berlusconi clarified his foreign 
policy objective.  “But it is time for Italy to ‘make itself felt in the world.’”117  By 
adopting a position supportive of the Bush administration, Berlusconi was able to raise 
his profile in Europe, and to define himself in contrast to French and German leaders.   
D.  ITALIAN THREAT PERCEPTION 
Prime Minister Berlusconi’s assessment of threats to Italian security prior to 
September 2001 could be summarized with three words:  “illegal immigration” and 
“crime.”118  After the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, 
additional concerns involving the defense sector more explicitly, such as the increasing 
gap between American and European military capabilities and an Italian military 
establishment ill-suited to act effectively in the post-11 September environment, became 
more pressing.  To answer these concerns and present a concrete roadmap towards 
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solutions the Berlusconi government issued, for the first time in sixteen years, a new 
Libro Bianco, or “white book,” on defense.  This document may be regarded as the 
Italian equivalent of the US Quadrennial Defense Review, both in scope and vision. 
In his preface to the white book, Italian Defense Minister Alberto Martini outlined 
the government’s purposes in publishing the document.  He acknowledged the new 
geopolitical order following the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 
and the consequent need for a reorganization of the Italian armed forces to confront these 
new threats.  Martini particularly emphasized the differences between the current threats 
to peace and security as compared to those posed by the Soviet Union.  He specifically 
identified international terrorism as a threat to Italian security; and he called for a 
reorganization of the Italian armed forces to better confront those threats.119 
The first chapter of the white book summarized the Italian threat assessment from 
the perspective of the defense establishment.  The situational assessment noted two 
watershed events:  the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the 11 September 
2001 attacks on New York and Washington.  The first released all parties from the East-
West alliance model.  This led to new security constructs, such as “unipolarity” and 
“hyperpower,” and allowed old grievances, such as those long repressed in the Balkans, 
to erupt.  The second shock shattered geostrategic assumptions and brought into 
consideration threats to security in Europe beyond spillovers from ethnic violence in the 
Balkans.  These new threats included international terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction as well as money laundering, drug trafficking, and 
organized crime.120   
In a 13 September 2002 speech to the UN General Assembly, Berlusconi was 
more pointed about the threat posed by international terrorism, endorsing the policy 
articulated by President Bush.  Berlusconi referred to the struggle against terrorism as 
necessary for the defense of human rights and the ideals of liberty, peace, and justice.  
This speech was the first instance in which he incorporated the threat posed by the 
government of Iraq as a component of the Italian threat assessment.  
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At this moment the main threat to the UN and to our system of values and 
principles comes from the regime governing Iraq that systematically 
violates all the resolutions of the United Nations.  A response is necessary 
and indispensable to safeguard the international community from the 
danger constituted by the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction.121   
The Bush administration was convinced of the imminent danger of the WMD it 
believed that Iraq had acquired, while President Chirac was unconvinced.  Berlusconi’s 
approach incorporated considerations that diverged from the positions of both France and 
the United States to develop an Italian approach to the Iraqi threat.  First, Italy had a long 
history of domestic terrorist threats.  Most of the original Red Brigade leaders had long 
been imprisoned but “next generation” new cells were emerging.  Moreover, Red Brigade 
connections remained available to terrorists who cared to use them.  Al Qaeda was 
discovered to have active cells in Italy, and a possible marriage between anarchist and 
Islamic terrorist organizations constituted a critical domestic security consideration.  
Second, with over 7,000 kilometers of Italian coastline, even the most stringent 
immigration controls could only reduce the human influx; they could not be expected to 
prevent it entirely.  Lastly, southern Italy is within the range of missiles that could be 
available in North Africa and the Middle East in the foreseeable future.  The proliferation 
of missile technology and WMD constituted a possible threat of attack against Italy.122  
To what extent Berlusconi incorporated these factors into his decision-making calculus is 
unknown.  However, he was clearly aware of them.  These considerations may have 
influenced Berlusconi to support the American-led intervention in Iraq as a measure 
against the spread of weapons technology and the diffusion of Islamic terrorist activity.     
E. SUMMARY 
The 2001 election in Italy ushered in a center-right leader whose political and 
economic policies were closer to those of US President Bush than to those of French 
President Chirac.  The crisis between France and the United States over possible courses 
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of action in Iraq offered an opportunity for Prime Minister Berlusconi to strengthen US-
Italian ties by demonstrating that under his leadership Italy was a more loyal ally than 
France.   
Berlusconi’s ability to finesse a policy between the French and American 
positions may have enabled him to manage his relations with his domestic constituencies 
and EU critics more successfully than if he had adopted a position unambiguously 
aligned with that of the United States on the model of British Prime Minister Tony Blair.  
An understanding of Italy’s political history is central to appreciating the 
dynamics that bounded Berlusconi’s ability to act authoritatively in both foreign and 
domestic policy.  His latitude was restricted by the Italian constitutional structure that 
forced him to organize a governing coalition rather than a strong central government.  
Even though his party, Forza Italia, won a credible majority, this did not allow him to 
dominate the government.  Rather, he had to balance the competing interests of his 
coalition partners with his own policy objectives; this resulted in a policy on Iraq that 
appeared strong, but that required minimal political or military action.       
Berlusconi’s ambitious domestic agenda included unpopular reforms.  This was 
especially true of his goals to streamline government-owned industries and to reform 
state services.  To achieve these goals required that Berlusconi expend political capital.  
This constrained his ability to pursue a foreign policy that might require a similar 
expenditure of political capital.  However, the possibility of contracts for reconstruction 
in Iraq following the intervention may have offered enticing opportunities for Italian 
firms, which could further Berlusconi’s domestic economic policy by promoting greater 
industrial activity, increased employment, and additional US-Italian business interactions, 
notably in post-Saddam Iraq. 
Pope John Paul II’s unequivocal opposition to military intervention in Iraq further 
complicated Prime Minister Berlusconi’s ability to articulate a decisive policy.  The 
Pope’s critical stance united diverse opposition groups.  On top of needing to balance his 
own government coalition, Berlusconi was compelled to take the Pope’s concerns into 
account, together with the opposition movement inspired by the Pope. 
The Italian threat analysis appeared to be more flexible than that of either the 
Americans or the French.  Although defense documents clearly included crime, illegal 
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immigration, and international terrorism in their threat calculus, Berlusconi was able to 
develop the concept of Iraqi WMD as a proximate threat as a result of the prospect that 
regional instability would lead to increasing waves of illegal immigration.  His assertion 
that regime change in Iraq would result in greater stability and might therefore reduce 
illegal immigration was an effective argument in Italy. Berlusconi’s approach fused 
aspects of the American threat assessment with important components of the Italian 
assessment, creating a specific interpretation to justify support for the American-led 
















V. ANALYSIS  
The election of center-right governments in France, Italy, and the United States 
between 2000 and 2002 could have introduced an era marked by commonalities in 
domestic and foreign policy objectives.  Analysis of the circumstances under which each 
candidate won his office might have predicted moderate, centrist domestic and foreign 
policies. However, various events, including the US-led invasion of Iraq, the US 
treatment of enemy detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and impasses regarding World Trade 
Organization negotiations, polarized relations between the United States and some 
NATO allies.  Commentators on both sides of the divide predicted the dissolution of the 
Atlantic Alliance.  Some officials in the Bush administration may have reinforced these 
divisions through the pursuit of a new doctrine of creating ad hoc coalitions rather than 
continuing reliance on established alliances. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
offered an explanation for favoring specific coalitions of the willing for some purposes: 
“[W]ars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure. But they should not be 
fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must 
not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest 
common denominator, and we can’t afford that.”123 Rifts among European leaders 
reinforced the perception of polarization and facilitated the American ambition to 
establish a mission-driven coalition.   
George W. Bush became president through the intervention of the United States 
Supreme Court during the much-contested 2000 election.  Political elites in NATO 
Europe were reassured by the appointment of many veterans from his father’s 
administration, which offset the new president’s image as a foreign policy neophyte.  It 
was assumed that he would pursue policies similar to those of his father, under the 
tutelage of experienced foreign policy hands.  The Bush administration’s measured 
military response in Afghanistan to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 followed 
many of those hallmarks—a multilateral coalition operation with relatively defined 
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objectives.  Other aspects of the administration’s strategic direction and response in 
confronting international terrorism were more confusing.124 
Jacques Chirac was elected in May 2002 by a nominally overwhelming popular 
mandate.  However, the choices available to the French electorate created a misleading 
impression.  Expectations concerning French domestic politics were upset when Chirac’s 
presumed opponent, the Socialist leader Lionel Jospin, was defeated during the first 
round of the elections.  This loss catapulted the ultra-right National Front candidate Jean-
Marie Le Pen into primary contention for the presidency of France.  Le Pen’s anti-
Semitic, anti-immigration, anti-European positions attracted only a limited constituency, 
and thus only about 18 percent of the vote.  Chirac became the preferred option for most 
French voters and thus was elected with a deceptively wide margin of victory.125   
Italian domestic politics were also in upheaval following the collapse of the 
dominant Christian Democrats amid corruption charges in the early 1990s.  The 
demolition of the political establishment opened the field of contention to the surviving 
leftist parties—including the communists—and the emerging political aspirants united 
under the banner of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia.  Berlusconi’s election with a large majority 
was due in part to the attractiveness of his message, but also in part to the nature of his 
opposition.  The Italian electorate was reluctant to trust a left-leaning government. 
 This chapter provides an analysis of the diverse factors that affected French and 
Italian decisions regarding the March 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq. Next, this chapter 
examines the international dynamics that resulted in disruptions within NATO and the 
European Union.  This chapter seeks to answer the following questions.  Does the 
division over Iraq represent a key change of political alignments?  What are the possible 
short- and long-term effects on US-French and US-Italian relations?   
A. FRANCE 
French politicians since Charles de Gaulle have challenged American leadership 
in Europe and have often attempted to counterbalance American influence.  Even prior to 
the overwhelming cultural flood emanating from America after the Second World War, 
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the French were concerned with the threat of Americanization to French customs.  The 
tradition of resisting American influence may have contributed to French opposition to 
American policy on Iraq.  France’s opposition to the possible intervention in Iraq was 
attributed by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to obstructionism:   
They are frequently recalcitrant about a lot of things.  Any given day or 
week their role in NATO—they seem to be the country that disagrees with 
a lot of other countries.126 
He dismissed the impact of the French decision on other American allies.   
Now, you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France.  I don’t.  I think 
that’s old Europe.  If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the 
center of gravity is shifting to the east. … Germany has been a problem, 
and France has been a problem.127 
The extreme acrimony that accompanied the discourse between the American and 
French governments exceeded the bounds of pointed diplomacy.  Divisions of allies into 
“Old Europe” and “New Europe,” and other diplomatic jibes by President Bush, 
Secretary Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz served to 
exacerbate tensions and divisions rather than providing an opening for an amelioration of 
relations.128  US commentators suggested that the reasons might include typical anti-
Americanism, excessive concern about investments in Iraq, and occasionally French-Iraqi 
circumvention of the oil-for-food program.129  The contrast between the base motives 
attributed to the French and the lofty, moral security goals of the United States aroused 
domestic ire in particular sectors of the United States, ultimately precipitating silly 
reactions like renaming French fries “freedom fries.”  This public lashing of the French 
government and its position helped to widen rifts within the European Union.  Paris 
demanded loyalty from current and prospective EU members to either the United States 
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or to France, with consequences to follow for the “wrong” decision.  The pointed 
exchanges were not one-sided; French and German representatives also had harsh 
reactions to American criticisms.   
It would be inaccurate to suppose that French policy was driven solely by 
stubbornness, or by a determination to protect French business interests or to challenge 
American hegemony.  It appears that French policies were animated by an interest in 
maintaining the global status quo, by skepticism regarding the American justification for 
the use of force (particularly as applied to links between Al Qaeda and Iraq), and by 
concern for post-war political turmoil in Iraq and beyond.130    
 President Chirac dismissed concerns about French investment losses in Iraq and 
denied that France was involved in violations of the oil-for-food program.  He asserted 
that economic interests in Iraq constituted 0.2 percent of French foreign trade and that 
Iraqi oil constituted less than 8 percent of total French imports.  Chirac categorically 
rebuffed allegations of French involvement in prohibited arms sales to Iraq.131     
It is plausible that the history of French policy in this region circumscribed the 
range of actions available to Chirac, and that certain domestic political factors reinforced 
those choices.  Initial obstruction that yielded to support of American objectives, once 
certain French pre-conditions had been achieved, was an alternative widely anticipated 
outcome.  Chirac’s rigid opposition to the American-led effort was not anticipated by 
European analysts.132   
Many American observers dismissed the French opposition to military 
intervention in Iraq as another instance of French obstructionism.  However, an 
alternative explanation deserves consideration:  that French foreign policy has been 
reasonably consistent in certain respects since the end of World War II.  Indeed, certain 
policy principles have been followed by all of France’s national leaders irrespective of 
their domestic political orientation.  In this case, policies of respect for international law 
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and maintenance of French autonomy influenced decisions on the immediate issues in 
question.  This convergence of past practice and present assessment resulted in a policy 
of opposition to the US-proposed military intervention in Iraq.133 
Similarly, the impression expressed by some Americans that the French were 
incapable of an effective use of force is misinformed, as the history of French operations 
in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and in Afghanistan since 2001 shows.  It was a French 
judgment that the use of force in Iraq in early 2003 would be inopportune and 
destabilizing in the region. 
Certain domestic factors may have played a subordinate role in shaping President 
Chirac’s decision to pursue his selected course of action.  These factors include the large 
Muslim population in France, public opinion, a countervailing threat assessment, and a 
negative evaluation of US diplomatic efforts.  Key secondary considerations may have 
been German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s antipathy to the American-led intervention 
and a French goal of exerting the power of a unified European Union as a credible force 
in a multipolar world.  Each factor had the potential to discourage active support for a 
US-led intervention in Iraq or to further polarize the French and American points of view. 
It is not French practice to maintain statistics on religious preference, so 
demographic information on French Muslims as a segment of the French population is 
estimated or extrapolated from other information.  Estimates of the Muslim population 
place it between 4.5 and 5 million people, or approximately 7 to 8 percent of the 
population.134  The difficulties of integrating immigrants whose social, religious and 
cultural affiliations differ significantly from the perceived mainstream French 
“civilization” were highlighted as themes by Le Pen during the 2002 election, and 
continued to resonate across Europe.  Increasing incidents of anti-Semitism in France 
attracted the opprobrium of the American and Israeli governments, although evidence 
indicated that some of these occurrences were related to political frustrations with events 
in the Middle East rather than neo-Nazi tendencies.135  Some observers expressed 
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concern that a protracted and destructive intervention in Iraq could produce significant 
civil disorder and increased incidents of domestic terrorism in France.136  Other observers 
judged that the impact of domestic Muslim concerns was negligible in the formation of 
French policy about the central question of Iraq.  French Muslims are more concerned 
about the increasing strife in Israel and the Occupied Territories.  Therefore, resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would offer a greater opportunity to lessen tension in the region, 
with a concomitant reduction in potential civil unrest or domestic terrorism in France.137 
It is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of the effect of French public opinion in 
shaping President Chirac’s decision to oppose the American-led intervention in Iraq. 
There are two areas in which public opinion and domestic policy may have had mutual 
influence:  perceptions of the threats and perceptions of possible solutions.   
The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund’s analysis, 
entitled Worldviews 2002, illuminated several variations in perceptions in French and 
American public opinion regarding US foreign policy.  Polling data on America’s role as 
the sole superpower showed French respondents overwhelmingly supported the advent of 
a unified European entity to counterbalance the United States (91 percent) as compared to 
76 percent in Italy and 48 percent in Germany.138  This correlates to President Chirac’s 
position that American unipolarity was dangerous, and to France’s stated foreign policy 
objective to establish a common European Union position on international relations.139 
Regarding the use of force in Iraq, only 6 percent of French respondents 
supported American unilateral action and 27 percent opposed any intervention in Iraq.  
The majority of those polled—63 percent--supported American intervention only under 
the auspices of UN approval.  In the 2002 Worldviews study, American public support for 
intervention in Iraq was similar to that in France:  65 percent supported intervention if the 
UN approved, and 13 percent opposed intervention under any circumstances; 20 percent 
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of the Americans polled supported unilateral American intervention.140  This data 
suggests that during the period covered by the surveys, May and June 2002, American 
and French reactions to possible intervention in Iraq were similar.  These surveys predate 
the intense public campaigns by the Bush administration to solidify support for a 
coalition against Iraq. 
A notable difference in these surveys is the variation in the perception of the 
threats to national safety and their origins.  65 percent of French respondents viewed 
international terrorism as a threat, much lower than the 91 percent of American 
respondents.  On Iraq’s possible WMD, 58 percent of French versus 86 percent of 
American respondents saw these as a source of threats.141  As tensions escalated and as 
French and American government officials attempted to convince domestic and 
international audiences of the validity of their respective opinions, the French public may 
have been more inclined to support a cautious approach to the threat, while the American 
public may have been more susceptible to the barrage of statements definitively linking 
the Global War on Terrorism, Iraq, WMD, and Al Qaeda together into a unitary threat.   
A January 2003 IPSOS/Le Monde opinion poll found 77 percent of French 
respondents opposed to intervention in Iraq.142  A January 2003 poll conducted by the 
Pew Research Center found increasing support for military intervention in Iraq among 
American respondents:  46 percent supported military action regardless of the findings of 
UN-sponsored weapons inspectors, and this increased to 76 percent if WMD caches 
could actually be located.143  By March 2003, these positions were solidified:  59 percent 
of American respondents favored war against Iraq, and 75 percent of French respondents 
opposed war against Iraq.144     
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The combination of increasing public opposition and French Muslim hostility to 
US policy in particular may have dissuaded the French government from offering overt 
support for US policy in Iraq.  Yet, had President Chirac been convinced by the 
American threat assessment, he could have pursued other avenues despite public opinion.  
The leaders of Britain, Italy, Poland and Spain each faced substantial public opposition to 
intervention in Iraq—51 percent of the British, 81 percent of the Italians and the Spanish, 
and 73 percent of the Poles opposed the American-led intervention.  However, each 
national leader shaped a national policy that supported to varying degrees the American 
position.145  Instead, Chirac steadily opposed the US-led intervention, his decision 
resonating with French public opinion.   
President Chirac’s assessment of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq 
differed substantially from the American threat assessment.  His perceptions were 
consistent with those found in public opinion polls, and he dismissed the American 
assertions regarding Iraqi WMD and Iraqi connections to Al Qaeda.  French threat 
assessments and reactions to American proposals can be divided into two categories: the 
threat of international terrorism and the threat of Saddam Hussein and WMD in Iraq.  The 
Bush administration tended to lump these concerns together into a single, hydra-like 
problem.  The French assessment saw international terrorism as a threat distinct from 
Saddam Hussein’s WMD.  Moreover, French officials argued, an intervention in Iraq 
might either side-track or undermine the campaign against international terrorism. 
In an October 2002 speech at the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies, 
French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin highlighted his perception of threats to 
France and international security.  He emphasized in particular concerns about 
terrorism—both international and domestic—and WMD proliferation.  However, 
Raffarin also discussed other destabilizing elements which threatened peace and 
international order.  His regions of concern included Israel and Palestine, Africa, and 
Pakistan-Kashmir-India. 146   
                                                 
145 Ibid. 
146 French Government Releases, “Fifty-fifth session of the Institute of Higher National Defense 
Studies (IHEDN) – Speech by M. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Prime Minister.”  14 October 2002.  
http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr or http://www.ihedn.fr  
 73
Raffarin’s speech followed the release of the American National Security Strategy 
and President Bush’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2002.  In what 
may be seen as a partial rejection of the American threat assessment, Raffarin cautioned 
against categorizing disparate elements of regional instability as terrorism.  While he 
agreed that Iraq remained dangerous and that Iraqi WMD acquisition could constitute a 
threat, he strongly supported an enhanced weapons inspection regime as the appropriate 
first course of action to counter this threat.   
As if to account for American belligerence, Raffarin asserted that the United 
States was still in shock following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  He offered 
French empathy for the American desire to pursue security through the use of unilateral 
military intervention; but he indicated that France did not condone that course of action, 
and suggested that the United States return to a more multilateral approach.   
While France shares the United States’ natural determination to respond to 
the attack to which she was a victim, France wishes her to remain true to a 
vision of collective security resting on the law, cooperation between states 
and the authority of the Security Council.147  
American and French threat assessments concurred that Saddam Hussein’s 
control of Iraq was a threat to stability in the Middle East and to international security 
more generally.  The method to either mitigate or eliminate that threat was the issue of 
contention.  The American conclusion was that regime change in Iraq would have a 
beneficial effect on political stability and security in the region; it would eliminate bases 
of support for international terrorism, and would ensure positive control over WMD 
stockpiles in Iraq, thus eliminating a source of proliferation.  Objections to intervention 
included the concern that the threat to regime survival might provoke Saddam Hussein to 
use WMD in desperation or to collaborate with Al-Qaeda, thus accelerating WMD 
proliferation; or that war in Iraq would precipitate more instability and violence in the 
region.148   
A final factor which may have influenced Chirac’s ultimate decision to oppose the 
possible American-led intervention in Iraq was a series of diplomatic impasses that 
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reinforced differences and diminished points of commonality between France and the 
United States.  Representatives of the Bush administration dismissed or belittled 
European contributions following the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
October 2001.  Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz represented Secretary 
Rumsfeld at the Munich Conference on European Security Policy in February 2002.  
Although he praised NATO’s contributions to the International Security Assistance Force 
in Kabul, Afghanistan, in general terms, he primarily commended non-European or non-
NATO coalition partners.   
No leader has taken greater risks in the struggle against terrorism than 
President Musharraf of Pakistan and no country has more at stake in this 
fight. And right here in NATO we have an ally, Turkey, that is a model for 
the Muslim world’s aspirations… Those who would criticize Turkey for 
its problems confuse what is problematic with what is fundamental, focus 
too much and ignore where it is going.149  
Ongoing disputes about US decisions not to ratify the Kyoto Accords or the Rome 
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, economic discord over steel tariffs 
and farm subsidies, and frustration over the US treatment of Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, added to the tension in US-French relations.150  As 
France and Germany expressed doubts about the sagacity of the proposed intervention, 
their loyalty and value as allies were questioned.  This marginalized leaders who failed to 
support the American intervention.  The stark positions in the Bush administration of 
either “with us” or “against us” provoked resentment in Europe.151 
The reasons for French resistance to American policies were multiple and varied.  
French antipathy to American proposals may have stemmed in part from the archetypal 
French resistance to American leadership that has characterized Franco-American 
relations since the troubled relationship between de Gaulle and Roosevelt during World 
War II.  However, to dismiss Chirac’s opposition to intervention in Iraq as simple anti-
Americanism would be incorrect.  It is more likely that his decision to oppose the 
American action was influenced by several factors—an interest in maintaining 
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international balance, respect for international law, and countervailing threat and cost-
benefit assessments.  It is also probable that his negative reactions to American 
diplomacy solidified Chirac’s domestic political position rather than defined it.   
B. ITALY 
The Italian government headed by Silvio Berlusconi was regarded by the Bush 
administration as a loyal ally in the war on terror in spite of its comparatively minor 
military contributions.  Although Berlusconi’s personal desire to reinforce ties with the 
American president and the United States cannot be discounted, his decision to support 
the American position was probably influenced by factors beyond a desire to please 
American allies or to express differences with other EU leaders.  Considerations that may 
have also affected Berlusconi’s decision calculus included the Italian Muslim population, 
the balance of domestic politics and public opinion, Italy’s economic situation, a 
variation of the American threat assessment, and possible interdiction of WMD or 
terrorist threats emerging from Northern Africa.  A secondary impetus may have included 
a desire to counterbalance Franco-German domination of the leadership of the European 
Union. 
Italy’s Muslim population is small compared to that of France--about 1 percent of 
the population.152  Restive Italian Muslims opposed to Berlusconi’s support for US 
positions may not have represented a level of concern similar to that in France.  However, 
in contrast to France’s overwhelmingly enfranchised Muslim population, the Muslims in 
Italy are comparatively disenfranchised and less of a factor in national politics.  Muslims 
in Italy are seen as transient and therefore as less of a public opinion factor than in 
France.153    A1 Qaeda cells in Italy in proximity to radicalized, unassimilated Muslim 
immigrants nevertheless increased the danger of domestic terror attacks and the danger 
that Italy would be used as a staging ground for attacks against other objectives.154  The 
possibility of either civil disturbances or attacks by Al Qaeda operatives may have had a 
moderating effect on Berlusconi’s support for the American position. 
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Prime Minister Berlusconi faced other contentious factors which he needed to 
balance in order to support intervention in Iraq.  The coalition structure of Italy’s national 
government presented a threat to Berlusconi’s hold on power.  In this respect, he faced 
challenges in conducting an unpopular foreign policy that neither President Bush nor 
President Chirac confronted.155  Intervention in Iraq was unpopular with the Italian 
public, the Pope, the political opposition, and components of Berlusconi’s coalition.  
Shifting alliances within his governing coalition had ended Berlusconi’s first term as 
prime minister (27 April – 22 December 1994); his current government could have as 
quickly descended into internecine squabbles if either of his coalition partners, the Lega 
Nord’s leader Umberto Bossi or the National Alliance’s leader Gianfranco Fini, had 
decided to join the opposition.    
Pope John Paul II’s ability to influence the Italian political agenda is difficult to 
ascertain.  However, prior to the start of hostilities in Iraq, he exerted himself through 
diplomatic missions to Iraq and the United States, and through encyclicals advocating the 
value of peaceful conflict resolution instead of military action in an effort to promote 
negotiations.  His office rejected American evidence of Iraqi failures to cooperate with 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UN Monitoring, Verification and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspectors.  The pope excoriated the rationales for 
military intervention in Iraq.  His opposition divided Italian public opinion, and united 
diverse Italian opponents to Berlusconi.156   
Italian public opinion mirrored French public opinion. Indeed, Italians expressed 
stronger opposition to war under any circumstances and less support for war, even with 
UN approval, than did the French.  During the May 2002 Worldviews interview period, 
33 percent of the Italian public opposed intervention in Iraq; only 54 percent supported 
intervention with UN support, and 10 percent supported American unilateral action.157  
By March 2003 opposition to war in Iraq had increased, with 82 percent of Italian 
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respondents opposed and only 17 percent in support of intervention.158  Public 
manifestations against military intervention in Iraq included significant demonstrations in 
major metropolitan areas.  Another concrete sign of anti-intervention sentiment included 
an organization called Disobbidienti (disobedients) whose concerted efforts were directed 
towards disrupting US military movements in Italy and hampering Italian military 
assistance efforts.  The Italian government went to great lengths (and at significant 
political risk) to guarantee unfettered movement of the US military in Italy.159  
The Italian public’s opposition to military intervention in Iraq did not correlate 
directly with the public’s perception of threat; indicators were generally higher than in 
the French case but lower than in the American threat assessments.  67 percent of Italian 
(compared to 60 percent of French and 91 percent of American) respondents saw 
international terrorism as a critical threat.  Iraq’s WMD merited concern from 57 percent 
of Italian (compared to 43 percent of French and 86 percent of American) respondents.  
The Italian public also expressed a high perception of threat from immigrants and 
refugees:  52 percent of respondents saw this as a threat to Italian security; in France, 34 
percent of respondents viewed immigration as a threat.  American perceptions of 
immigrants as a threat exceeded the threshold in of all the European countries surveyed, 
with 60 percent of respondents noting immigration as a threat to American security.160  
Although the Italian public saw Iraq as a threat, military intervention was not the optimal 
solution to counter the threat, especially as that might increase the flow of refugees. 
In the cases of France and the United States it is possible to speculate on the 
impact of public opinion on foreign policy or the impact of government actions to gather 
support for a particular foreign policy.  However, in the case of Italy, Prime Minister 
Berlusconi executed a foreign policy for which there was little public—or political—
support.  Berlusconi’s pursuit of an unpopular foreign policy incurred significant political 
risks and invited the dissolution of his government.  To accept such risks, Berlusconi 
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must have calculated the possible political benefits.  What follows is a review of the 
factors that may have encouraged him to pursue an unpopular foreign policy.   
With Italy burdened by recession following the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks, lethargic economic initiatives, and EU-driven fiscal constraints, Berlusconi may 
have seen intervention in Iraq as a partial solution to an economic problem.  US officials 
asserted that the ouster of Saddam Hussein would be militarily simple, and that 
democracy would be quickly established.  In February 2002 Ken Adelman asserted that 
“demolishing [Saddam] Hussein’s military power and liberating Iraq would be a 
cakewalk.”161  Umberto Bossi, a key member of the Berlusconi government and the 
leader of the Lega Nord party, proffered a similar analysis.  “The war will be finished in 
the time in which one can smoke a Tuscan cigar.”162   
Perhaps convinced that military intervention in Iraq was inevitable and success 
guaranteed, Berlusconi may have seen the reconstruction effort as an opportunity to 
revitalize Italy’s economic sector.  To ensure access to post-war reconstruction contracts, 
Berlusconi cultivated a position supporting the American-led operation as a loyal ally.  
He lessened ill effects with his domestic constituency and partially disarmed his political 
opposition by limiting visible support during combat operations to passive cooperation. 
Concrete security interests may also have contributed to Berlusconi’s support for 
intervention in Iraq.  Although the Prime Minister’s support for the intervention as a 
partial solution to the problems of international terrorism and Iraqi WMD was at variance 
with that of the Italian public, the government and the people shared a common 
perception regarding the source of the threat.  Before 11 September 2001, crime and 
illegal immigration dominated Italian security concerns; international terrorism and Iraqi 
WMD subsequently superseded these concerns.  Berlusconi’s public discourse effectively 
linked the source of illegal immigration (primarily from North Africa) with sources of 
international terrorism—characterized as primarily poverty and political repression.  He 
further presented Iraq’s WMD possession as a threat to Italian national security. 
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His success was evident in the political support he garnered to grant the US 
military overflight and basing permissions before the start of hostilities.  Political support 
to send in 3,000 Italian carabinieri following the fall of Baghdad is additional evidence.   
When Prime Minister Berlusconi outlined his threat assessment to the UN 
General Assembly in September 2002, it appeared that he accepted all of the American 
premises:  that containment was not a successful implement to disarm the Iraqi 
government; that freedom and democracy are the antidotes for terrorism; and that gaining 
positive control of Iraqi WMD now would be preferable to a less controlled confrontation 
at a future date.  He appears to have disregarded concerns over the possible proliferation 
of WMD beyond the state control of Saddam Hussein into the hands of Al Qaeda in the 
event of a military intervention.  He may have also viewed intervention as a measure of 
prevention against future inundations of illegal immigrants.     
One component of Berlusconi’s election campaign promises—that of 
strengthening US-Italian ties—was realized through his vocal support for President Bush.  
Prior to the events of 11 September 2001, Berlusconi’s reemphasis on improving 
relations with the American government appeared to be a continuation of the policy of 
maintaining strategic alliances followed by Italy since World War II.163  
After the clash of political wills between the United States and France over Iraq, 
Berlusconi’s efforts to support the American position while preventing a rift with France 
or Germany may have reflected a desire to preserve the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance 
and the European Union.164  As the vitriol level escalated between France and the United 
States, NATO’s future was questioned.165  Italian support for the intervention in Iraq 
expanded President Bush’s “coalition of the willing,” and kept the Americans and the 
Italians engaged in dialogue. 
A final influence on Berlusconi’s decision to support the American position may 
have been the public reprisals taken by the Bush administration against Germany’s 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, following his strong opposition to American action 
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during his 2002 electoral campaign.166  Italy’s delayed entrance into the fray gave 
Berlusconi time to analyze possible repercussions of any anti-American decision.  The 
Bush administration’s denigration of France and Germany may have proven cautionary, 
dissuading wavering allies from aligning themselves against the US position.   
Despite its opposition to US policy and subsequent “punishment,” Germany’s 
extensive economic relations with the United States, among other factors, prevented a 
complete rupture.  France may have been better positioned globally through its 
Francophonie links, World Trade Organization protections, and alternate spheres of 
influence to resist any American retaliation.  Italy’s smaller economy and more unstable 
political order would have made political and economic recovery more challenging.  The 
vigor with which Franco-German opposition to US policy efforts was scorned by 
Washington may have reinforced an opportune decision for Berlusconi to cement a 
“special relationship” with President Bush while firmly establishing Italy’s place in the 
European Union.   
The decision by Prime Minister Berlusconi to support the American-led 
intervention in Iraq in spite of considerable domestic opposition and Franco-German 
pressure appears to have been based on a combination of factors.  The need to harmonize 
domestic opposition to intervention with maintaining a strategic alliance with the United 
States required that Berlusconi execute intricate maneuvers.  Moreover, his range of 
action was circumscribed by the nature of his ruling coalition and the constitutional 
constraints on the Italian government.  It is possible that a desire to avoid US rancor also 
influenced Berlusconi to adopt a pro-US stance rather than a pro-French stance.   
The first part of this chapter reviewed the factors that may have influenced the 
governments of France and Italy in their decisions to oppose or support the US-led 
intervention in Iraq.  Hence, it encompassed such domestic concerns as public opinion 
and threat perceptions.  An assessment of the relationship between those factors follows.   
Comparing public opinion and official policy statements in France and the United 
States, one difference emerges:  that is, the definite link between Al Qaeda and Saddam 
Hussein that was emphasized in the US government’s justification of intervention stands 
at odds with the French judgment that no such link was evident or likely.  That these 
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convictions about the Al Qaeda/Saddam Hussein link had a positive impact on American 
support for intervention can be inferred from the comparatively high level of public 
support in the months prior to the intervention in Iraq.167  Had this link not been so firmly 
asserted and so widely accepted, it is possible the American public might have expressed 
less support for the administration’s policy.  By contrast, President Chirac actively 
questioned the presumption of extensive links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s 
regime.   
No evidence has been found so far—or at least has been made official—of 
ties between Iraq and international terrorism, and particularly al Qaeda.  
… We have no proof that Iraq is involved in international terrorism or al 
Qaeda in particular.168   
The public in France appeared to have adopted a similar assessment of the threats—
Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda versus Saddam Hussein’s regime—and to have come to the 
conclusion that the threats were distinct and unrelated.   
President Chirac may have calculated that his opposition to the American led-
intervention would garner increased political and diplomatic support for his position; he 
may have judged that the American backlash would be negligible.  Prime Minister 
Berlusconi apparently calculated that the Americans were right, especially in their 
expectation of a rapid win in Iraq; he probably judged that he would not sacrifice an 
excessive amount of domestic political capital in supporting President Bush.  The current 
state of trans-Atlantic relations indicates that some errors in political judgment were 
made.     
The political fractures leading up to the American-led intervention in Iraq resulted 
in significant disruptions to the trans-Atlantic relationship.  Some observers judge that it 
was the worst crisis since the 1956 Suez intervention by Britain, France and Israel.169  
America’s relations with France and Germany reached a low point in 2002-2003. 
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To what extent does the US-French division over Iraq represent an enduring 
change in political alignments?  Since Charles de Gaulle’s return to the leadership of 
France in 1958, Franco-American relations have vacillated between high levels of mutual 
respect and support and episodes of estrangement.  De Gaulle provided complete support 
to the United States support during the Cuban missile crisis, yet withdrew France from 
the integrated military command structure of NATO to pursue an independent nuclear 
deterrence policy.  He sought to establish a distinct path for his nation between the 
dominion of the Soviet Union and the United States, and his concerns over the 
superabundance of American influence were reflected in his political, economic, and 
social decisions. 
The events of 2002/2003 reflect a certain continuation of this trend.  President 
Chirac’s confrontations with the Bush administration exceeded simple objections to US 
policies in the UN Security Council.  The French were perturbed because the American-
led action would violate their interpretation of international legal principles.  While the 
American position was that action was necessary to save the United Nations Security 
Council from irrelevance (and that the United States and its coalition partners had 
sufficient authority to act under existing UN Security Council resolutions), the French 
interpretation was that the proposed American-led action would undermine the authority 
of the UN Security Council.   
The Italian government has been a US consistent ally since the foundation of the 
Atlantic Alliance.  That Berlusconi sought closer ties with the United States during the 
Iraq crisis may have appeared extreme to some observers given the popular opposition to 
the proposed US-led intervention; but it was not exceptional in the history of American 
Italian relations.  Indeed, a deviation from the chosen course of action towards an 




The March 2003 military intervention in Iraq by a US-led coalition resulted in a 
deep rift between the United States and certain allies.  This is particularly true of relations 
between America and France.  In contrast, the debate over intervention enabled the 
Italian government to express support for the American position, strengthening relations 
between the two governments.  The preceding analysis found that factors in addition to 
the issue of the Iraqi regime’s lack of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 
concerning WMD possession and proscribed delivery means probably influenced the 
French and Italian decisions.    
What follows is an assessment of the effects of the 2002/2003 Iraq crisis on US 
relations with France and Italy.  This conclusion examines some possible outcomes of the 
rift in Franco-American relations, and their implications for the future of these relations 
and intra-EU relations. 
In Italy’s case, the Berlusconi government’s support for President Bush’s policies 
ensured continuing good relations.  However, critical assessments of Prime Minister 
Berlusconi’s performance in domestic and foreign policy could result in a change of 
government.   
For Franco-American relations, 2002 and 2003 were exceptionally bad years.  
According to a highly respected Italian expert, this was the worst episode in US-French 
relations since the 1956 Suez crisis.170  The pervasive antipathy expressed by both sides 
eroded confidence on many levels.  Confidence in the United States as a reliable ally and 
guardian of international order was replaced by wariness about US unpredictability and 
mistrust of US intentions.  Popular and media attacks in the United States on the motives 
of the French and the Germans only exacerbated an already tense situation and deepened 
resentment.171  Ameliorating relations will require considerable effort in Paris and 
Washington.    
                                                 
170  Marta Dassù, “One year on:  lessons from Iraq.”  Chaillot Paper Number 68, March 2004. p. 36. 
http://www.iss-eu.org  
171 Bruno Tertrais, “The Perfect Storm.” Survival, Volume 46, Number 3 (Summer 2004), p. 164. 
 84
Already some steps to overcome the recent acrimony have been taken.  
Cooperation between the United States and France in alleviating chaos in Haiti in early 
2004 following the collapse of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government is one 
instance.  Following a unanimous vote in the UN Security Council, a Multinational 
Interim Force designed to restore civil order, to which France contributed approximately 
300 soldiers, was dispatched.   
In August and September 2004, France assumed command of two key NATO 
operations.  In August 2004 France took command of the NATO-led multinational 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, to which France 
contributes approximately 1,000 troops.  France is therefore one of the largest 
contributors to security in Afghanistan.  The French command of the NATO-led Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) for a year beginning in September 2004 is expected to further the 
normalization of relations between the United States and France.  In another important 
effort to rebuild trans-Atlantic relations, President Chirac supported the decision by 
NATO in June 2004 to participate in training Iraqi security forces despite strongly held 
reservations about the implications of further NATO involvement in Iraq.   
However, interactions between some American and French government officials 
were particularly acrimonious, and in some cases, individuals have yet to be reconciled 
with their counterparts, and remain irritated by the emotions expressed in 2002-2003.  
For example, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reportedly refused permission for the 
French military to participate in US-sponsored international military conferences and 
exercises, and restricted US Department of Defense participation in the Paris Air Show.  
Mutual professional respect and practical considerations in addressing security and 
defense challenges are nonetheless regaining lost ground.  Exercises and exchanges are 
important factors in ensuring smooth interactions in future combined military 
operations.172 
The Iraq crisis precipitated a large shock for the European Union’s aspiration to 
formulate and pursue a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  Much of the 
dispute between France and Italy (and the other EU members) was not concerned with 
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issues of economic policy or threat assessments; instead, it centered on control over the 
CFSP agenda.  That is, who determines the EU’s foreign and security policy?  This 
experience may have created conditions under which the major EU powers will attempt 
to establish greater unity to deal with the next crisis.  A common foreign and security 
policy is intended to enhance EU cohesion, and to ensure that the EU will have more 
influence over US policies than individual EU countries had during the Iraq crisis. 
However, it may be difficult for the EU to achieve that level of success in the near 
future.  The May 2004 enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 members increases the 
complexity of an already cumbersome decision-making process.  Moreover, the new 
member nations may consider that they have an interest in maintaining strong bilateral 
relations with the United States.  In the case of some new EU members (for instance, 
Poland and the Baltic states), this may be attributable to a judgment that Russia remains a 
threat to their national sovereignty, and that an American security guarantee is more 
credible than a French or an EU guarantee.  This may also be attributable to the same 
problem that burdened relations between France and supporters of US policy such as 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom:  control over the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy agenda. 
As suggested above, another factor may be the strength of bilateral relations 
between the United States and individual EU nations.  As was revealed during the 2002-
2003 Iraq crisis, some nations may judge that their national interest requires combining 
security derived from an alliance with the United States with economic benefits derived 
from membership in the EU.  In this instance, loyalty to a security interest may outweigh 
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